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FOREWORD
Though taken for granted, there is a meaningful
difference between conflict-specific, or era-particular, modes of warfare and the general nature of war.
In this monograph, Major Daniel Maurer, author of
Crisis, Agency, and Law in U.S. Civil-Military Relations,
philosophically reflects on the fundamental nature of
war and sets out to reinvigorate its study by emphasizing that no examination of warfare’s trend lines and
character can be complete without first establishing a
common universal reference for what war itself is—a
question that seems unassuming, but is actually without a consensus among those that study or engage in
combat. Only with an updated and thoughtful understanding of war’s nature, he argues, will warfare in its
many guises and forms be properly placed in a theoretical framework that illuminates deviances from norms
or expectations, and which accounts for the phenomenon of war across time, place, and culture.
Major Maurer takes a number of unconventional
steps in his study that ought to provoke serious discussion and considered reflection among those who
would decide that war, rather than other diplomatic
or economic crisis-resolution approaches, should be
embarked upon as a political act for policy reasons.
With references and analysis of political, historical,
military theoretical, sociological, and artistic descriptions of war, Maurer finds that no unified field theory
adequately and comprehensively reconciles contrasting views of what war is. Concluding that war is
best understood as a series of integrated or embedded frames of reference repeating a single common
theme (choice) like a musical fugue, made up of polarized antagonistic parties engaged in a clash of their
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respective Clausewitizian “trinities,” Maurer crystallizes two new descriptions of war’s elemental nature:
first, an “investment in organized violence by parties
interested in the extension, maintenance, or appearance of their power over an unspecified time, with an
unknowable risk, for an uncertain reward;” second,
“an intentional attempt to negate the equality of opportunity to express a violent choice across multiple scales
of action.”
Major Maurer’s analysis is complex and novel,
and forces us to reimagine how and why wars exist
as enduring human activities. By questioning conventional views and pursuing entirely new ways of understanding war’s nature, his is a voice very much needed
from a generation of scholar-soldiers that matured
during the first decade-and-a-half of the global war on
terror. His insights will undoubtedly push forward a
conversation about war’s fundamental nature that for
too long has been left unqualified.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Major Daniel Maurer begins assembling his framework by respectfully questioning the received wisdom
that Clausewitz was the last and most comprehensive
word on the subject of war’s underlying nature. First,
despite some common ground regarding the relevance
of war’s political basis, he finds no consensus (no “unified field theory”) among practitioners, presidents,
political scientists, sociologists, or historians—from
Clausewitz to Wylie to Keegan—that satisfactorily
accounts for all of war’s varying shades, and which
legitimately recognizes its basic elemental components, its evolving character, and the “Why?” that animates or inspires parties to engage in conflict. Noting
that not even the U.S. Department of Defense has a
doctrinal definition of war, Major Maurer cross-examines some well-known and entrenched interpretations,
including those of H. R. McMaster, Rupert Smith, and
Emile Simpson, in the hope of reconciling their differences and linking their similarities with a view toward
a new explanation that is consonant with descriptions
and forecasts of wars—past, present, and future.
Second, Maurer moves through and past Clausewitz, piercing the Clausewitzian trinity of passion,
reason, and chance to unearth even more elemental
components that comprise war regardless of scale. To
accomplish this, Maurer embarks on a wholly original
avenue of approach: thinking about war from the “perspectives of compounding relevant points of view existing simultaneously and in concert,” what he analogizes
to a musical fugue. This fugue of war, like its musical
counterpart, is governed by a repeating theme—here,
Maurer proposes choice as that single, dominating
trait that defines war at any scale, imagined or studied.
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Maurer, ultimately, uses this theme to reconcile two
of the more antagonistic or polarized stances on the
nature of war.
Finally, building on Clausewitz’s more abstract
conceptions, Major Maurer describes war as a “clash
of the trinities” in which basic elements—the biological actors, the material, and psychological fuel that
empower and embolden them and their interactions—
form a context-specific “ecology of war.” He depicts
this clash with a novel visual analysis, illustrated by
historical vignettes: a series of embedded frames that
encompass the polarized parties, their interactions,
and the legitimizing authorities that move them.
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THE CLASH OF THE TRINITIES:
A NEW THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
GENERAL NATURE OF WAR
INTRODUCTION
If we are to identify whether war is changing . . . we
need to know first what war is . . . [but] one of the central
challenges confronting international relations today is
that we don’t not really know what is a war and what
is not. The consequences of our confusion would seem
absurd, where they not so profoundly dangerous.1
Quaint and curious war is [emphasis added].2

War is a state of mind, a way of managing or
rearranging social relationships on large scales, a
macrocosm of activity, and a term pregnant with presumptions, dark and bloody connotations, and confusion. War, like a family or art, is a human convention or
tradition based on primordial drives and social needs;
no matter how modern we believe we become, the convention remains part of our legacy and culture even
if its manifestations evolve into various nontraditional
forms or in unexpected ways.
In two very good recent articles, military officers
have grappled with another elusive abstraction. In
“The Mud of Verdun,” Major Robert Chamberlain
proposed that a theory of warfare describes, “how a
military intends to produce strategic outcomes” by
establishing a war’s “ordering principles.”3 If a government or head of state, for example, believed in—
and directed the military to engage in—warfighting
based on principles of speed (through terrain) and
1

overwhelming force of arms, it would possess a theory
of warfare. Likewise, a theory might be illustrated by
tactics and strategies of Mao, or the Boers, or al-Qaeda,
or the use of proxy states or covert operations; or, like
Sun Tzu, all thought and resources were devoted to
winning without fighting at all. In particular, Chamberlain found four “essential components” to theories
of warfare: “strategic givens, a generated military,
military effects, and a political outcome.” In other
words, a theory of warfare is a recipe involving basic
ingredients and a fundamental process for combining
them into a product for consumption. Like any recipe,
though, the chef’s idiosyncratic style, tastes, and
kitchen conditions will tend to modify the amounts
of each ingredient and how they enhance or dull the
ultimate dish being served—the German or American
way of war. Chamberlain, seemingly in agreement
with Wayne Lee’s assessment of capacity, writes that
the “resource context” and the “desired political outcome” will largely dictate.4
In Capturing the Character of Future War, Colonel
Norwood and Majors Jensen and Barnes asked, “How
should military officers describe the future operational
environment?”5 They correctly suggest that answering
it is a crucial duty of the profession as it advises our
civilian principals on everything from where to invest
in technology and the human dimension or domain,
to modifying our doctrine and negotiating with allies.
Where Chamberlain describes a theory of warfare in
a way reminiscent of a recipe, these authors propose
a predictive analytical framework. They marry up
an ever-shifting Clausewitizian character of war (the
“co-mingling of the motives and circumstances governing uses of force to compel an adversary to do
one’s will”) to trends analysis in three areas (rate of
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technological change, strength of state governance,
and the state of the international system).6
These are big questions, and the authors should
be commended for asking them. But they are not the
proper starting point. Before we can hope to understand the character of a war, or to formulate theories of
warfare, we must first appreciate, and collaborate with
our civilian principals, on the more fundamental question of what war, itself, is. As we will see below, it is a
superficially easy question, but with layers beneath it
that reveal critical distinctions; these distinctions provide a new opportunity—and a new duty—to work
with our civilian principals as their expert agents to
accurately understand the forces that shape and define
war.7
But why go to all this trouble? Skipping the first
principles and going straight for the practical consequences is nothing new, and the resulting muddled
analysis is nothing to be surprised over. The word
“war” itself is derived from the Old High Germanic
word, werran, meaning to confuse. In his seminal A
Study of War, Quincy Wright saw multiple and contradictory meanings of war propagating in the public’s
mind: a terrible plague, an avoidable mistake, a useless
anachronism, an interesting adventure, a useful instrument, or a legitimate legal procedure.8 These meanings
run along a spectrum from the absolutely unredeemable and horrible on one end to the acceptable and
sometimes positive choice, like an elective surgery. All
this suggests that if we—but in particular the civilian
and military strategic elites that run our wars—who
are trying to avoid war, but have failed, might need
a recalibrated understanding of the phenomenon.9
By talking of war, we talk of hearing a very distant
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thunder but do not know how to explain it, predict it,
or silence the noise with much success.10
THERE IS NO UNIFIED FIELD THEORY
Explaining that distant thunder often falls prey to
the desire to systematically or scientifically define it.
As a repeated human activity, with certain obvious
common denominators, players, features, and prefatory events, it is no great wonder that wars have been
studied in their contexts of time, place, and motive,
hunting for some universal definition. For example,
one can propose that war is an acute state of armed
aggression, using means of violence possessed by
organized networks of people, arrayed against an
enemy belligerent, in order to achieve some collectively-agreed upon purpose. This captures all the
points assumed to be essential: a limited and definable
window of time that covers a lifecycle of a war, that
it involves violence, that myriad groups of people in
various states of organization are the participants, and
that some animating ambition drives their behavior.
But for all that, this is still a sterile and sanitized definition of war. It is not a soldier’s definition; it is more
like a political scientist’s definition. But most soldiers
do not force themselves to stringently objectify the
concrete and very personal struggle they endured, and
most political scientists do not actively participate in
the war fighting they casually study.
Quincy Wright, a legendary social scientist who
advised Justice Robert Jackson during the Nuremberg Trials, described war in the latter style: war is the
“legal condition which equally permits two or more
hostile groups to carry on a conflict of armed force.”11
Generalizing from conditions found in all conflicts
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historically referred to as “war,” he concluded that
they are characterized by four common essentials: military activity (ranging from normal preparatory training to battles), high tension levels in public opinion,
what he termed “abnormal law” (suspension of treaties, halting of trade, rules of force legitimizing the use
of force), and “intense political integration” of each belligerent.12 Among his many contributions to the study
of international relations and war, Wright is said to
have developed a theory of war that suggests warlike
violence breaks out and spreads when these forces are
held unchecked by human adjustments and controls,
becoming unbalanced or no longer in “equilibrium.”13
This theory is more about the variables that create a
welcoming environment, or rushing current, for war
and less about the phenomenon itself, for his research
goal was to uncover those material factors that—if
properly tuned by an adequately knowledgeable and
wise culture—could short-circuit or dam up what otherwise would seem to be an inevitable rush to violence.
Jack Levy, as another political science example,
defines the subject of war as the “sustained, coordinated violence between political organizations.”14 In
other words,
War should be understood as an actual, intentional and
widespread armed conflict between political communities
. . . War is a phenomenon which occurs only between
political communities, defined as those entities which
either are states or intend to become states (in order to
allow for civil war) [emphasis in original].15

Levy notes with caution, however, that academic social
science studies of war leave something to be desired.
They have:
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limited predictive capacities, and enormous divisions
within the field. There is no consensus as to what the
causes of war are, what methodologies are most useful
for discovering and validating those causes, what general
theories of world politics and human behavior a theory
of war might be subsumed within, what criteria are
appropriate for evaluating competing theories, or even
whether it is possible to generalize about anything as
complex and contextually dependent as war.16

Even the taxonomy of war is complicated.17 Since 1963,
the Correlates of War Project, a university-led data
collection effort, has attempted to systematically categorize, classify, and historically track statistics for a
range of international combative activities. There are,
for example, the class of wars between two or more
members of the interstate system, and a class of wars
between or among nonstate autonomous entities, nonterritorial entities, and nonstate armed groups. The
Project also adds restrictive—and arbitrary—numerical quotas to define the kinds of combat that it classifies as “war.” To distinguish war from a massacre,
riot, crime, or ethnic cleansing by a government on
its own people, the Project requires a commitment of
1,000 troops by a belligerent party, or suffering 100
battle-related deaths, in order to be labeled a participant state in a war. If a nonstate actor engages, those
numbers shrink to 100-armed personnel or 25 battle-related deaths. But, generally, the Project winnows
war down to mean the “sustained combat with 1,000
battle-related deaths between or among the combatants per year.”18 Max Boot contends that databases like
this, starting at these magic numbers, exclude what
he calls invisible armies fighting small guerilla wars
and insurgencies. Boot argues that those conflicts—the
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small-scale, low-tech, but impactful—are historically
ubiquitous and likely to continue far into the future.19
Of course, there are colorful metaphors offered by
Clausewitz, describing war as a duel, wrestling match,
or game of cards to emphasize its inherent physicality,
polarity, and unpredictability; that it is an act of force
to compel the enemy to do one’s will, and nothing but
a continuation of politics or policy by other means.20
For reasons I will describe below, these remain helpful reminders, but an entirely transparent lens through
which to observe the inner structure of war.
If academics have no unified field theory to understand, describe, or define war, does the layman or
professional service member stand a chance? Other
languages, outside of rigorous methodological construction of dependent and independent variables,
might work just as well. Can artistic depictions help
us visualize what war means, if only idiosyncratic to
the artist and an audience of admirers? Is the nature
of war’s core best expressed in Picasso’s disassembled, grieving victims in his painting Guernica—the
narrative story of the civilian victims of conflict? Or is
it in the pile of bleaching skulls picked over by crows
in Vereshchagin’s Apotheosis of War—the unalterable
truth that war is, at its most graphic and banal, the
proximate cause of systemic death, without glory,
trappings of chivalry, brotherly compassion, or any
other way to cover up the effect of war? Or is it found
in Leutze’s stout Washington Crossing the Delaware—a
capture of defiant heroism against oppressing odds?
Maybe poetry, instead, captures and distills war in a
helpful way: Hardy’s The Man He Killed, Tennyson’s
The Charge of the Light Brigade, or Brian Turner’s collection in Here, Bullet. Hardy wrote his poem around
the time of the British engagement with the Boers, and
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confronts us with the truth that two soldiers aiming for
each other across a battlefield are, in any other context,
just two ordinary and similar men with similar tastes,
desires, fears, and lives. One hundred years later, Iraq
War veteran Brian Turner wrote of the doubt, hesitation, and insecurity a soldier faces when distinguishing friend from foe in heat of a fight:
If you hear gunfire on a Thursday afternoon,
it could be for a wedding, or it could be for you. . . .
You will hear the RPG [rocket-propelled grenade]
coming for you.
Not so the roadside bomb.
There are bombs under the overpasses,
in trashpiles, in bricks, in cars.
There are shopping carts with clothes soaked
in foogas, a sticky gel of homemade napalm.
Parachute bombs and artillery shells
sewn into the carcasses of dead farm animals.
Graffiti sprayed onto the overpasses:
I will kell [sic] you, American [emphasis in original].
Men wearing vests rigged with explosives
walk up, raise their arms and say Inshallah [emphasis in
original].
There are men who earn eighty dollars
to attack you, five thousand to kill.
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Small children who will play with you,
old men with their talk, women who offer chai—
and any one of them
may dance over your body tomorrow.21

It is perhaps this uncertainty with how to grasp
the meaning of modern war in a modern world that
inspired the Washington, DC, think tank, The Atlantic
Council, to start its “Art of the Future Project,” whose
mission statement reads:
The project’s core mission is to cultivate a community of
interest in works and ideas arising from the intersection
of creativity and expectations about how emerging heroes
and antagonists, disruptive technologies, and novel
cultural and economic concepts may animate tomorrow’s
world.22

The Project has inspired artists, fiction writers, and
active duty officers to contribute their impressions of
what the future of war might hold, given their sense of
where it is now, with a shared objective to reveal:
unconventional, imaginative thinking and expression
[that] contribute[s] meaningfully to the study and
professional conduct of diplomacy, the creation of
technology and domestic policy and national engagement
abroad.23

Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, a decorated
combat veteran of two wars, a historian and author,
asserts that military officers have a “duty as leaders
to develop our own understandings of our profession
and the character of armed conflict.”24 Admiral J.C.
Wylie, for instance, wrote that the sailor, airman, and
soldier are possessed of intellectually-distinct modes
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of thinking about war: their respective maritime, air,
and continental theories of war are based on the environment in which those professionals work.25 They
risk being too narrow, under-representative, and context-dependent as a result. They are not general theories, but rather points of departure for planning.26
In the 1950s, Samuel Huntington raised the same
concern about the American military, but warned that
the separate armed services—though differing in what
fueled their budgets, goals, weapons of choice, and
geographic dimensions—had evolved and professionalized into a “corporate military viewpoint [and] had
hardened into a stable pattern of belief and a fixed way
of looking at the world” different from that of political leaders.27 This proves a critical concern because, as
McMaster cautions, the character of war changes over
time and place. Moreover, when it does, those changes
are often confused, inflated by hubris or ahistorical
ignorance into a resounding claim that the nature of
war has changed too.28 The confusion and hubris is
compounded when civilian and military elites, each
in their own way, attempt to move through this haze
with their own institutional perspectives that may
be at odds, or one when of these “unequal partners”
deliberately or negligently ignores the others’ advice or
position.29 In the last 3 decades, we have seen the end
of the Cold War, the Persian Gulf War, the Kosovo
War, the recognition of and accounting for hybrid
warfare,30 gray zone wars,31 various manifestations of
fourth-generation war,32 and the War on Terror.33 Moreover, those are just the highly-visible examples from a
distinctly Western viewpoint. In all of those manifestations, for all of their different characteristics, what—
if anything—has really changed? If nothing has, then
what forms the lowest common denominator?
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Eminent military historian John Keegan began and
ended his most famous work, A History of Warfare,
with that same question—What is war?—and argued
that it if you tried to uncover a pure and single nature
of war, you would fail.34 Cultures, nations, tribes,
weapons, and the policies or decisions that fling all of
these together violently, he wrote, are too dependent
on the time, circumstances, and location of the fight
to leave anything like a universal account possible. It
was Keegan who took issue with Prussian Carl von
Clausewitz and his famous—and nearly universally
accepted—maxim that war is a branch of political discourse, or the adoption of warfare ways and means to
communicate civil policy or signal political demands.
Those in uniform, like Clausewitz, McMaster, and
Wylie, are, perhaps inevitably, prejudiced by their
participation. “Two years of shells and bombs—a
man won’t peel that off as easy as a sock,” wrote Erich
Maria Remarque.35 One’s exposure to war’s effects—
either by planning them, following and giving orders
to manage them, or being devastated by them—affects
the manner in which they are intellectually and emotionally comprehended. Keegan, though never serving
in uniform or holding an elective office, did accurately
proffer a common denominator to all battles. He wrote
that of the “human element” that creates paradox after
paradox: war showcases the “sense of honor and the
achievement of some aim over which other men are
ready to kill” that fights off the “instinct for self-preservation;” the potent juxtaposition of fear and courage,
leadership and obedience, compulsion and insubordination, anxiety and elation, and violence and compassion.36 In this regard, he was very keen, and many
veterans who reflect on this esoteric subject would
tend to agree with him.

11

Wylie, for instance, wrote that war is “Death and
destruction and heartbreak, political upset and economic chaos and social disorder.”37 To visualize this
secondhand, one can visit soundless battlefields
marked with granite monuments and leaning gravestones, and read ghostly and graphic depictions from
the diaries of the soldiers who lived through the
campaigns. One can read the letters scribbled from
soldiers’ cots between missions and sent far too infrequently to parents, spouses, and others. One can walk
solemnly through museums with vintage muskets,
fraying and fading uniforms, rusting entrenching tools
and compasses, torn map shreds, and static displays
of tanks and jet aircraft that long ago went technologically extinct. One can read the memoirs of the strategic
policymakers—the kings, ministers of war, presidents,
chiefs of staff, and field marshals—who ordered troops
to the field and maneuvered them through deserts, or
directed showers of aerial bombardment, or negotiated
for peace. Perhaps one can meet the civilian survivors
or refugees of a war that shook their world without
their say-so. Maybe someday one will fight in his own
war and experience the adrenalin rush, the anxious
boredom, the fear that is ever-present but usually stoically contained, the instant fraternal bonds, the physical strain and emotional toll, the waxing and waning
of disillusionment and patriotism, and the longing for
home. As Clausewitz penned,
the novice [approaching the “rumble of guns grow[ing]
louder”] cannot pass through these layers of increasing
intensity of danger without sensing that here [on the
battlefield where “the sight of men being killed and
mutilated moves our pounding hearts to awe and pity”]
ideas are governed by other factors, that the light of
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reason is refracted in a manner quite different from that
which is normal in academic speculation.38

Perhaps after all that, one can decide if Keegan was
right and whether the words of Colin Gray ring true:
“there is an essential unity to all strategic experience
in all periods of history because nothing vital to the
nature of function of war and strategy changes”39—
that what we see and feel now about war is nothing
but an “expression of the ageless phenomena” of war.40
To Brodie, it was nothing much more than “men killing on a grand scale for reasons that are usually foolish
and often wicked.”41
Historians and philosophers have long agreed
on what those foolish and wicked motives are, that
people—individuals and collectively—go to war
for three primary reasons: fear, honor, and interest,
according to Thucydides; and competition (for gain),
diffidence (for safety), and glory (for reputation), says
Hobbes.42 Not only might these be the animators of
a soldier’s personal pride when choosing to flee or
to fight, but they may also be the motives of villages
and tribes when they arrange an ambush on a heavily-armed convoy of American infantry from a pine-covered hillside in rural Afghanistan,43 or entire nations
as they cajole and plead and negotiate themselves into
alliances and coalitions.44 However, fear, honor, and
interest (or gain, safety, and reputation) speak more
plainly to particular, specific conflicts.45 They do not
define the gravamen of conflict per se—the forces that
triggered those emotions to stir and rumble in the first
instance. Maybe it is madness, first felt and manifested
by one megalomaniac, then spread and adopted by
culpable, converted groups, until its violent message
and goals are shared by masses. Maybe it is society’s
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way of testing by trial the truth of traditions and collective beliefs, as J. F. C. Fuller considered the American
Civil War to be a test of the “hollowness of [the] myth”
of slavery and Southern economic independence in
face of the Industrial Revolution.46 Kenneth Waltz,
writing in the first decade of the Cold War, suggested
that understanding the use of military force must be
based on understanding the relationship among three
other factors or images—bellicose human nature fired
by long-held customs and traditions (which really
just encapsulates the motives mentioned by Thucydides and Hobbes), the structure of the belligerent
states (how domestic policies constrain or fuel foreign
affairs), and the international system of those states
competing with or against each other.47
But what if, contrary to Wylie, war is not a harbinger of chaos but instead a social and expected norm—
where its absence, a state of peace, would unravel
traditional, legitimate ways that people resolve their
disputes? Jared Diamond portrayed such a war in the
highlands of modern-day Papua New Guinea, practiced in an area with little centralized state control and
long hard memories between tribal clans. Vengeance
there serves as the honorable, expected, and legitimate
fuel for community on community aggression and violence where the cause of warfare is usually attributed
to a woman or a pig, both sources of individual and
family wealth and prestige.48 To Machiavelli, war—or
more precisely being prepared for war—was an innate
and intimate part of civil society, defending the society’s laws, values, and resources. Military might was
the roof protecting a palace of fine jewels from the
natural degradation caused by weather over time.49 In
other words, war (its utility) was both common and
common sense.
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The definitions of war on which most modern
American military officers have been trained to appreciate, but not educated to really reflect upon, seem
inadequate to the task. (Perhaps this inadequacy is
made worse by the fact that not even the U.S. Department of Defense maintains a working definition of the
term war even though the terms wellness, wounded
warrior programs, and working group are blessed
with Joint-approved definitions.50) Not only do they
not match visceral impressions of conflict (as Sir
Michael Howard put it: they do not “bridge the gap
between war as it has been painted and war as it really
is”), they also never answer the question integral
to any definition or generic description of war: “But
why?”51 Those definitions do not explain, so much as
they distinguish.52
The nature of war is not a study of how terrain, tactics, tenacity, or luck shaped the course of a particular
battle. Nor does it mean the political causes and effects
of a specific engagement. Nor does it mean the strategic setting of a long campaign. Instead, it encapsulates something both bigger and blurrier, like aiming
NASA’s Hubble Telescope at a patch of sky to look
deep in time and distance. For example, stretching out
the meaning of war to cover activity on both peace and
combat, James Dubik writes that:
war is a form of community expression—politics in the
classic sense—of a willingness to use organized, armed
violence to attain community aims. Waging war, therefore,
entails both the defeat of enemy forces and their will to
fight and the defeat of the community’s corporate ability
and will to use violence. Such defeat requires combat and
diplomacy.53

15

The idea of questioning and describing the nature of
war, from a theoretical and abstract point of view is, of
course, risky for several reasons.
First, a critic might suggest that no one has thought
more deeply or written more persuasively on this subject—the theory of war’s nature—than Clausewitz in the
early 19th century. He is immortalized and preserved
in war college texts as “The Dead Prussian,” spoken of
in deferential tones, and inspires books, websites, and
podcasts.54 Anything written post-Clausewitz, then,
can only be an explanation of Clausewitz, an over-simplified derivative of his arguments, a rebuttal of his
claims, or—worst of all—a generally interesting but
intellectually tame tale of fiction that ignores the timeless truths he first and foremost explained.55 In any of
those cases, any knowledgeable observer would, of
course, unfavorably compare and contrast to the original master. “Nothing so comforts the military mind,”
Barbara Tuchman once wrote, “as the maxim of a great
but dead general.”56
Second, a critic might note that nobody, actually,
cares. Even if Clausewitz was wrong, incomplete, or
needs updating, the topic is one that has little relevance
because it sparks such little public interest. That critics would say that such an effort generates no useful
meaning for the actual actors that: talk about the use of
military force, approve the use of military force, direct
and engage in the use of military force, witness or feel
the effect of that use of military force, or try to describe
and record the history of that use of force.
Clausewitz, we can rest reasonably assured, cannot
speak to us from the 19th century with universal
authority. His writings on the nature of war—while
helpful starting points—do not define the subject in a
way useful for understanding the strategic dynamic
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between the civil and military leadership in a representative democracy with a constitutional division of
labor and responsibility, nor in a world of hyper-technical cyberconflicts or hybrid wars in gray zones, and
hegemonies fighting limited counterinsurgencies.
For example, he considers war “nothing but mutual
destruction.” While we can dilly over what he may
have intended by “mutual” and “destruction,” and
perhaps argue that both terms possess shades of
meaning to capture a wide range of potential parties to
the conflict (some central, some not very) and a wide
range of effects (economic, military, social, political),
Clausewitz was less obtuse here than in other areas.
He defined war as a clash of arms: “fighting is the
central military act [and] the object of fighting is the
destruction or defeat of the enemy.”57 Perhaps so, but
is it always?
Sometimes, the mere presence of an armed force—
occupying space and possessing the potential to do
great harm—is the signal of support to an ally, the
signal of intention to a fence-sitter, or the signal of
threat to an enemy and may be the sole political point
for which a military has been deployed. As we will see
below, from the perspective of the host community in
which that armed force is postured, the foreign army’s
inactivity does not erase its perceived or apparent belligerency. This tense ambiguity makes docking military necessity and actions on the ground with political
motivations as difficult as aligning a space shuttle
with an orbiting satellite. Moreover, Clausewitz’s
vision of war included a court or cabinet in which the
commander directing the campaigns of the war is an
integral member, “so that the cabinet can share in the
major aspects of his activities.”58 He assumed, probably unrealistically, a world in which, at the bottom,
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we can make the use of force “consonant with political objectives.”59 As we shall see below, Clausewitz’s
arguments are necessary, but not sufficient, predicates.
Along with every other student and practitioner
of war in his day, he suffered from the understandable inability—no matter how intuitively perceptive
or historically accurate he was—to forecast the technological means and methods of warfare that have colored the evolution of political blood-letting over the
last century and a half. Nor did he try. Clausewitz’s
appreciation of war as a political instrument, defined
by the relative influence (or fusion) of reason, emotion,
and chance, was informed by a way of war that pitted
nation against nation (really national heads of states
powered by popular conscriptions and drafts) for territorial gain, primed by age-old grievances, prejudices,
and honor.60 His image of war was action-driven,
results-based, and circumscribed: warfare by orienting
and directing one’s forces for a decisive battle in which
the only prime objective was to destroy the enemy’s
army as the means for breaking the enemy’s will to
fight.61
To a generation of American military officers raised
since the terrorist attacks in 2001, this image of war
seems somewhat dated and subtracts from the great
Clausewitz’s contemporary relevance. He does not
seem capable of explaining war in a way that helps us
grapple with diverging views of what forms war could
take in the future, or with the many forms it does take
in a single setting now. One contemporary Army Chief
of Staff predicted that future wars “could have conventional forces, Special Forces, guerillas, criminals
all mixed together in a highly complex terrain environment, with potential high densities of civilians.”
The Chief of Naval Operations remarks, somewhat
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differently, on the “return of great power competition . . . [including] naval combat at sea.”62 However,
this Clausewitzian model, for all of its faults, is not a
mirage. It just happens to appear only when certain
political conditions and military necessity are carefully running in parallel toward that end like speed
skaters on an ice track, and public acquiescence to the
bloody consequences of pitched battles is acceptably
high. It is, to illustrate, Robert E. Lee concentrating his
Confederate army at a tidy little urban juncture of a
dozen roads called Gettysburg, invading Pennsylvania
to lure the Army of the Potomac north to engage in a
decisive engagement that would so rattle the nerves
of the northern population they would sue for peace.63
It is President Lincoln’s frustrated exhortation to General Joe Hooker to fight Lee wherever he and his army
move, ignoring the temptation to move on Richmond
when the rebel Army headed north to Maryland and
Pennsylvania.64 It is President George H. W. Bush’s
rapid eviction of the Iraqi Army from Kuwait in 1991,
destroying large chunks of it with concentrated airpower and flanking tank forces, but allowing it to
retreat and ultimately protect the Saddam regime, still
intact in its palaces of Baghdad and Tikrit.
We do not really know how well (by that I mean
how helpful, persuasive, or authoritative) Clausewitz’s thinking stacks up against evidence of nontraditional or unconventional war. Do his arguments help
to understand Australian aboriginal hunter-gatherers
from 10 millennia ago, fighting each other in large,
familial groups over territorial boundaries in order to
monopolize their access to scarce and coveted game or
water resources?65 Surely, such primitive warfare over
basic needs is as much a potential setting of war as
cyberwar between China and the United States. From
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their perspective, if one can imagine their reflecting on
the matter, their violent aggressive competition was
no less intentional and widespread between political
communities than it is now between Israel and Hezbollah or Ukraine and Russia, or the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the West. If the latter examples are properly understood as war, why not the
former?66 And if it is, then Clausewitz’s appreciation
of war as the deliberate political application of professional military campaigns aimed at closing with and
destroying asimilarlookingenemyarmy in a great battle—
Austerlitz, Waterloo, Cannae, or Gettysburg—was too
particular.67
Nor can we easily apply all of his theory to more
modern samples of war: pseudo-secret cyberwar, an
international coalition of democracies fighting the
long war against terrorism, infusion of foreign troops
under a humanitarian responsibility to protect, or the
so-called gray zone and hybrid conflicts that seem to
preoccupy the attention of today’s civil and military
strategic leaders. Because deploying military force is
a choice, and comes at a cost in blood, treasure, time,
and reputation, perhaps a more generic characterization should be something like, war is an investment in
organized violence by parties interested in the extension, maintenance, or appearance of their power over
an unspecified time, with an unknowable risk, for an
uncertain reward. Now, this too is sterile, but it will
form the bedrock of a more colorful description below.
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REPORTS AND FORECASTS
You are in a pretty bad fix, Mr. President.
You are in it with me.68

That question of war’s nature—and what it means
for the dynamics of American civil-military relations
among its strategic leaders—must be answerable in
a way that acknowledges that war, whether it is a
timeless phenomenon of psychological, biological,
and sociological origins, or evermore technologically
complex tool employed by rational actors with state
or international legitimacy, is seen and felt and heard
through many instruments with differing roles, timing,
sounds, and cadences. So perhaps it is appropriate to
now cross-examine some old definitions.
War is fighting . . . fighting, in turn, is a trial of moral and
physical forces . . . still no matter how it is constituted, the
concept of fighting remains unchanged.69
Fighting is not the essence of war, nor even a desirable
part of it. The real essence is doing what is necessary to
make the enemy accept our objective as his objective.70

Can we reconcile these two definitions? Though wide
enough to drive a tank through, these definitions do
not suffer from the sterility and arbitrary taxonomy
of political science definitions mentioned earlier. The
first came from Clausewitz’s pen, after a lifetime of
observing, and participating in, warfare that expanded
its lethality, range, territorial ambition, and strategic genius under Napoleon. The second comes from
largely unheard of American Air Force Colonel who
played a significant role in crafting the strategy for the
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decapitating air campaign against Saddam’s regime in
Iraq in 1991, employing sophisticated smart bombs and
stealth aircraft before the 100-hour ground war ejected
the world’s fourth largest field army from Kuwait.
So is it war fighting or not fighting? Or something
else altogether that may or may not include fighting,
depending on the context and circumstances?
Although all wars have the essentials in common . . . the
details are always changing.71
War is political, human, and uncertain.72

Do these descriptions express the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth? Were they even meant
to? To paraphrase Dylan Thomas, they “had forked
no lightening,” despite the distant thunder,73 to spark
deep understanding. They are, instead, counterpoints
to an argument that the practice of war is always evolving. That argument is: as technology enhances a state’s
ability to identify, locate, target, and annihilate an
enemy military force, the number of actual combatants
taking the field shrinks, and the duration of fighting
shortens as the combatants’ efficiency rises. Our ability
to see, hear, and even feel the effects of combat proliferate globally in ways that mold public opinion faster
and thereby shape policy choices that start, continue,
or end those conflicts.74
Of late, in response to (and largely a fearful response
to) the advent of the military use of unmanned aerial
vehicles (also known as remotely-piloted vehicles,
unmanned combat vehicles, or armed drones), many
such arguments have found their way into the public
debate. Even psychologists, law professors, and philosophers have weighed in.75 Drones, according to
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Gregoire Chamayou (one such concerned philosopher), are replacing traditional, rules-based, hostility
with a “militarized manhunt” game of “hide and seek”
and “vast campaigns of extrajudicial executions.”76
Chamayou argues that drones are sucking the morally
excusable and explainable combat out of warfare altogether. His definition of war portrays the drone as the
latest evolutionary stage of warfare further separating
the use of military power from those that must own
and accept the responsibility for its use, and bringing
its violence to the doorsteps of the most unsuspecting
enemy—the belligerent who did not know he was considered a belligerent at all. It turns out that he echoes a
theme older than even the earliest unmanned combat
drone. On the eve of the World War II, British Major
General J. F. C. Fuller wrote: “[t]he more mechanical
become the weapons with which we fight, the less
mechanical must be the spirit which controls them.”77
In February 2016, the University of Notre Dame’s
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies held a
symposium called “The Ethical and Policy Implications of U.S. Drone Warfare,” debating the merits of
U.S. combat drones in the wake of an errant drone
strike on an Afghanistan hospital run by Doctors Without Borders in which 42 people were killed. Panelists
and moderators included theologians, public policy
professors, law professors, and reporters; no current
or former national security professionals, let alone soldiers, sailors, marines, or airmen, were members of the
august group, nor the nonvictim civilians of attacks
that could have been waged by conventional means
that likely would have resulted in significantly more
collateral damage than the average drone strike.
Philosophers and law professors are not alone in
believing this advance toward mechanical autonomy
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may be an unwelcome one. Former Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates cautioned that our ability to push a button
“in Nevada, and seconds later a pickup truck on Mosul
[Iraq] explodes” has turned war into an arcade game
in which political leaders of technologically advanced
nations can too easily and quickly turn to military
means to defeat an enemy without sufficient deliberation.78 Dave Grossman’s widely-read On Killing
describes how the physical proximity to the destructive act of violence that one wages correlates to his or
her “psychological cost” and mental health. Writing of
the urban fire-bombings and atomic bombs of World
War II,
The pilots, navigators, bombardiers, and gunners in
these aircraft [that delivered this ordnance] were able to
bring themselves to kill these civilians primarily through
application of the mental leverage provided to them by
the distance factor. Intellectually, they understood the
horror of what they were doing. Emotionally, the distance
involved allowed them to deny it . . . From a distance, I
can deny your humanity; and from a distance I cannot
hear your screams.79

Others have suggested that drones reduce the inhibition to resort to force as a means to solve a political
problem.80 Others have cautioned about the ugly strategic signal they send about a nation that uses such
weapons—a signal of the user’s cowardice, fear of
self-sacrifice, avoidance of physical dangers, and martial weakness.81 Others play on the public’s emotive
fear that the decisions to use these weapons of war are
too secretive. They argue that these debates are hidden
inside a “drone bureaucracy” and suggest that the “kill
chain” of decision-making is opaque and extra-legal,
executed by politicians and senior field commanders
without proper explanation to the American public
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and risking far too many civilian deaths outside of the
traditionally understood battlefield.82 The argument
suggests, “the act of willfully pinpointing a human
being and summarily executing him from afar distills
war to a single ghastly act.” It reinforces the military
and political inequalities of the belligerents and perhaps fuels an inspired mission of the disadvantaged
underdog against the Goliath.83
Of course, these arguments are not immune from
attack. On the ground, sensing the approach of a proverbial quarterback blitz, is not the morally sensible
and tactically smart decision to get out of the pocket,
avoid contact, all the while maintaining the offensive
on your own terms?84 What commander in his or her
right mind would deliberately expose ground troops
to direct fire in the midst of a population in which
civilian noncombatants are indistinguishable from the
armed hostile enemy? If that commander has access to
a system that does not talk back or question the morality or legality of an order, aims precisely, and avoids
human error and emotion, does she not have a moral
obligation to use it?85 Though arguably susceptible to
abuse (as all forms of weapons are) and open to the
claim of not fighting fair, any commander who would
recklessly expose troops and civilian noncombatants
by not relying on that system is arguably ethically contemptable.86 Sebastian Junger writes that war should
not be romanticized into a chivalric duel between morally equal belligerents:
soldiers gravitate toward whatever works best with the
least risk. At that point combat stops being a grand chess
game between generals and becomes a no-holds-barred
experiment in pure killing. As a result, much of modern
military tactics is geared toward maneuvering the enemy
into a position where they can be essentially be massacred
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from safety. It sounds dishonorable only if you image that
modern war is about honor; it’s not. It’s about winning,
which means killing the enemy on the most unequal
terms possible. Anything less simply results in the loss of
more of your own men.87

Leon Panetta, Gates’ successor as Secretary of
Defense, wrote that the “minimization of risk to American lives and those of noncombatants” were the basic
values that drive the development and use of those
advanced unmanned vehicles hunting terrorists from
the sky.88
For two reasons, the philosophical-moral alarm is,
at least now, worth a hit of the snooze button. First, the
jus in bello ethics debate is ongoing and not likely to be
resolved to any partisan’s complete satisfaction. The
drone’s ability to downscale war into a single, well-defined target for which the pilot (and chain of command)
determines precisely the time, location, and degree of
force has neither been overcome by attrition nor has
it been outflanked by the popular counter-argument
echoed by Panetta. While quick and efficient at killing,
drones do not seem to raise the kind of humanitarian
concerns and abject horror that machine guns—also
quick, efficient, and arguably intended to shorten the
duration of fighting—incited when they were introduced en masse to the European battlefields of World
War I, where defensive and offensive tactics were slow
to adapt to their intense rate of fire and helped prolong
the duration and casualty count of that war.
Second, the U.S. military clearly has not (yet)
adopted the drone as the sine qua non of warfare.
Instead, it has opined that war—as ageless as a Tolkien Ent and never truly endangered—is not simply
remote-control repression of enemy actors far from
our shores.89 Instead, war (as a justified true belief)
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has a consistent, unflappable nature: it is a contest of
wills, even if war’s modern character is continually
adrift, evolving, and adapting.90 The Australian Army,
too, adheres to a Clausewitizian view: that its nature is
stable and timeless, but its character is always evolving and sometimes the victim of revolutions—say, fast
information flow, media-driven cultural-moral audits,
or real-time critiques of how wars are managed and
fought.91 As does the British military.92 As does the
Indian Army.93 As does the French Army.94
The consequence of these character shifts, military
pundits and leaders lament, is war’s ever-increasing
complexity.95 This is an unconvincing argument—its
conclusion is not required by its premise. Relatively
speaking, the effect of that complexity at that time and
on the relevant actors is no graver than it was when
Hugo Grotius, Frederick of Prussia, or George Patton
considered their own contemporary character of war
and worrisome prospects for the future. When looking
back at Napoleon’s successes, Clausewitz wrote:
Very few of the new manifestations in war can be ascribed
to new manifestations or new departures in ideas. They
result mainly from the transformation of society and
new social conditions. But these, too, while they are in
fermentation, should not be accepted as permanent.96

Patton, at one point halfway into his career and
reflecting on his recent experience in World War
I and the special, technical, and narrow utility of
tanks, believed that they would fight alongside traditional horse cavalry and infantry, limited by their
size, weight, unsuitability for rough terrain. He could
not imagine, he readily admitted, “tanks, present or
future, real or imaginary, as ever operating . . . in the
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face of competent artillery, [or] on the sandy and gully-infested plains” of a desert landscape.97
Forgetting that the railroad and airplane once revolutionized the mobilization, transportation, and communication of force, modern commentators observe
that the velocity of information and ability to communicate among, and quickly assemble, huge throngs of
people seems to mock careful, mechanical planning for
conflict amongst the people. This caveat is concerning
because, some learned and experienced practitioners
believe, war fought alongside, deeply embedded in, or
immediately accessible to public interference, scrutiny,
or participation reflects a “new paradigm” of war.98
Retired British general Rupert Smith has argued that
the absence of traditional state-on-state military action
involving professional warrior classes, armored columns, artillery exchanges, air support and direct fire
engagements of infantry is proof positive that industrial-scale “war no longer exists.” Instead, he suggests based on observing trends from the last 40 years
that, war as we now know it, and practice it, does not
require armies at all. Rather, it is a “confrontation, conflict, and combat” at various scales but always in the
sense that the “people in the streets and houses and
fields—all the people, anywhere—are the battlefield.”99
To David Kilcullen, all scales of force from interpersonal violence to armed combat between professionals, with everything imaginable in-between, will
be “crowded, urban, networked and coastal.”100 War
will manifest as a series of fleeting engagements with
armed actors in the roles of professional militaries,
paramilitaries, gendarmes, police, and private security experts—sometimes working collaboratively,
sometimes competitively, sometimes belligerently.101
According to Peter W. Singer, one almost gets the
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sense that—under this view—war will look and feel
very much like a massive multiplayer online game, like
The World of Warcraft, or on a lesser scale, a first-person
shooter video game like Halo.102 To Emile Simpson, a
young scholar with credible combat experience as an
officer in the British Army, contemporary war is more
like armed politics: “constant evolutions of how power
is configured, in relation to various audiences, and how
that configuration is adjusted through the application
of a variety of means, both violent and non-violent.”103
If Rupert Smith is correct, he has largely dampened
(or rendered obsolete) the value of the international
legal definition of armed conflict, which holds: “any
difference arising between two States and leading to
the intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict . .
. [i]t makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or
how much slaughter takes place.”104 If Smith is correct,
war ought be defined as any difference arising between
any groups—regardless of how loosely organized they
are structured or how disjointed their aims—in which
violence is used to affect those aims.
Smith would not be alone in scoping war so
broadly. His non-legalistic definition seems to match
that of Christopher Bassford, a longtime scholar of
Clausewitz, who wrote that war is:
organized violence, waged by two or more distinguishable
groups against each other in pursuit of some political end
(i.e., power within some social construct), sufficiently
large in scale and social impact to attract the attention
of political leaders over a period long enough for the
interplay between the opponents to have some impact on
events.105

Maybe that does accurately describe warfare now or
in the near future. Perhaps war will look like the bleak
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picture presented by Kilcullen—that of urban guerilla
war in coastal megacities where the people, the prize,
the money, and the key terrain will be hunted and contested over like a buried treasure trove.106
Or, perhaps not. These definitions are really just
descriptive forecasts—maybe even accurate, and
important, ones at that. Clausewitz acknowledged,
“all planning, particularly strategic planning, must
pay attention to the character of contemporary warfare.”107 Nevertheless, these descriptions and forecasts
do not readily distinguish between “what is important and what unimportant, what belongs together and
what does not” in an account of what war is for the
crucial step of designing the relationship between civil
and military elites and accurately (or at least reasonably) evaluating that relationship and its consequential decisions.108 Perhaps they simply describe the most
visible copse of trees on a particular ridgeline within an
imperfect field of vision, like trend lines only suggesting fashionable and potential ways of doing the same,
age-old activity, just in new locations, with new kinds
of weapons. These definitions might miss the forest for
the trees, or the dune for collections of sand grains.109
If so, we are at risk (to paraphrase anthropologist Harry Turney-High) of confusing war with the
weapons of war, of cataloguing without comprehending.110 Or, as McMaster put it: “had conflated warfare
and warfighting [emphasis added]”—on one hand it,
“exaggerated the effect of technology on the nature of
armed conflict,” while on the other hand it, “dehumanized our understanding of war.”111
As theoretical psychologist Dietrich Dorner wrote
in The Logic of Failure, these “formless collections of
data about random aspects of a situation merely add
to the situation’s impenetrability and are no aid to
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decision-making.”112 Rather, a more general framework about war could help, as Walzer said of political theories,113 bring the right issues and questions
“into relief” in order to devalue, revise, or support
arguments about war. A framework, in other words,
agreed upon—and held up together—by both civil and
military hands clutching the sword.
War is simple to the 23-year-old platoon leader
returning from a late-night raid in his Armored Personnel Carrier, trailed by three other lumbering, noisy,
grease and muck-streaked APCs, carrying two-dozen
sweaty, tired, and frustrated soldiers, looking at the
most perfect full moon rise above endless jade palm
groves, right before a buried artillery shell, explodes
in an orange-red shower of sparks, metal, and asphalt
over his convoy. War, at that singular but repeatable
moment in time, is an unpredictable sucker-punch of
immediate anxiety, adrenalin, pain, anger, and fear. As
Turner put it:
Here is bone and gristle and flesh
Here is the clavicle-snapped wish
The aorta’s opened valves, the leap
Thought makes at the synaptic gap
Here is the adrenalin rush you crave.114

Later, to that lieutenant trying to describe the first
firefight he has been in (while riding in aluminum
patrol boats along a wavy ancient river at dusk) in the
most sanitized, sterile of language to his parents, war is
much more of the classical bout—Clausewitz’s polarity
between “us and them.” To the lieutenant, surrounded
by his troops, listening and partaking in the crudest
of jokes to pass the time and deflate the serial anxiety,
war is—what must appear to an outsider—as base and
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cruel and fallow: a war “displays the human condition
in extremes.”115
The soldier is on friendlier terms than other men with his
stomach and intestines. Three-quarters of his vocabulary
is derived from these regions, and they give an intimate
flavour to expressions of his greatest joy and well as of his
deepest indignation. It is impossible to express oneself in
any other way so clearly and pithily.116

Though that young lieutenant is now older, and no
longer leading soldiers against an enemy (however
defined), he still needs a way to reconcile what war is
to himself. What about civilian leaders reposed with
the duty of putting that lieutenant’s “boots on the
ground?” Is war simply the political calculus in three
sequential steps? First, label the political leadership of
another bellicose regime as the enemy. Next, let slip
the dogs of war, allowing everything that follows to
simply be a series of military operations with which
to avoid the appearance of political micromanagement. Finally, pull in the military forces—put them
back behind the glass—and declare a political victory
that follows the military one. For instance, before the
United States transitioned from a defensive build-up in
Operation DESERT SHIELD to the offensive Operation
DESERT STORM, former President George H. W. Bush
was presented with divergent opinions on the scale of
the military force needed if an ultimatum to Saddam
Hussein was to be issued. He refused to shortchange
the military’s naturally conservative and pessimistic
request for forces:
[National Security Advisor Brent] Scowcroft did observe
that the forces requested seemed excessive for the mission.
But I was determined not to haggle. The important thing
was to be able to get the job done without leaks about
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divided views on force requirements which tend to
reinforce concerns on the part of the doubters.117

This approach, which seems to manifest a philosophical definition of war that segregates the civil from the
military, elevating the former but reducing its responsibilities, was echoed a little more than a decade later.
When asked about withdrawing forces from Afghanistan, President George W. Bush told reporters:
I imagine us being there a long time. But my timetable is
going to be set by [General] Tommy Franks . . . [I’ve given
him] a well-defined mission . . . and when Tommy says,
‘Mission Complete, Mr. President,’ that’s when we start
moving troops out.118

But another, opposing, philosophical stand is possible
among the civilian strategic elite. To then-President
Barrack Obama, reflecting on his decisions during the
two wars he inherited from former President Bush,
war is characterized by “underdetermined costs and
underdetermined consequences . . . once the dogs of
war are unleashed, you don’t know where it’s going
to lead. [Waging war] is trying to impose clarity on
chaos.”119 In his acceptance speech for the 2009 Nobel
Peace Prize, President Obama said:
[N]o matter how justified, war promises human tragedy.
The soldier’s courage and sacrifice is full of glory,
expressing devotion to country, to cause, to comrades in
arms. But war itself is never glorious, and we must never
trumpet it as such. So part of our challenge is reconciling
these two seemingly irreconcilable truths—that war
is sometimes necessary, and war at some level is an
expression of human folly.120

In 1999, announcing the U.S.-led North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) military air campaign in
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Kosovo, then-President Bill Clinton described the war
he intended to halt and reverse:
[The Serbian Army has] started moving from village to
village, shelling civilians and torching their houses. We’ve
seen innocent people taken from their homes, forced to
kneel in the dirt, and sprayed with bullets; Kosovar men
dragged from their families, fathers and sons together,
lined up and shot in cold blood. This is not war in the
traditional sense. It is an attack by tanks and artillery on
a largely defenseless people [emphasis added].121

What is “war in the traditional sense?”
Like Dorner, Walzer, and McMaster, Clausewitz
advocated for just such a reflection, calling it a “frame
of reference” that, unlike a prescriptive manual, is
used:
to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish
precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full
the properties of the means employed and to show their
probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends
in view . . . and [t]heory exists so that one need not start
afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing
through it . . . [rather] it is meant to educate the mind
of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide
him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the
battlefield.122

While his views on war and warfare may call for more
reflection and possible updating, Clausewitz’s opinion that theories can have tremendous teaching value
remains unobjectionable and uncontroversial. Without
a useful framework to distill the experiences, analysis,
and historical lessons, a student of war (whether civilian
or military) cannot develop a refined perspective from
which to judge even contemporary developments.123
However, this characterization deserves a strong
caveat. That refined perspective should not be premised
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on fads and fashionable concepts.124 The drone does
not define war any more than a stony castle once did,
or an archer, or the pike, or the tank, or a Trident missile. Not every future war, nor even a current one, can
be reduced to the vague simplicity of “coercive diplomacy”—what retired General Wesley Clark defined
as “the use of armed forces to impose a political will.”
Clark expected modern war after Bosnia and Kosovo
interventions in the late 1990s to be marred by a collective post-war self-doubt, a sense that maybe armed
intervention should not have occurred; that even if it
should have occurred, maybe it could not be objectively won; that even if it had been won, victory would
have been clouded by the question of what, exactly,
had been accomplished.125 As a result, he concluded,
war will have to be “limited, carefully constrained
in geography, scope, weaponry, and effects.”126 The
American experience in Iraq between 2003 and 2011
certainly seems tainted by the same reflective selfdoubt Clark predicted in the late 1990s.
In a sense, Clark was applying the Clausewitz’s
famous idea of friction to the decrescendo phase of
conflict and smearing it across a much wider audience
than just the combatants. However, Clausewitz recognized that a theory about war itself cannot be based on
transitory phenomena, even if they seem to substantially characterize the modern, contemporary way, or
characteristics of war.127 Like a macabre theater, ISIS
now blatantly ignores the rules of civilized warfare
and uses the ancient, fear tactic of the savage public
beheading, filmed and released to the world free of
charge via the Internet, to watch from the intimacy of
a home computer to strategically influence a worldwide audience of both combatant and noncombatant
observers.128 To fight this unconstrained enemy, the

35

West has turned to special operators and drones, intermixed with conventional formations of foreign armies
it built, equipped, and trained for an entirely different
war. When war occurs on the periphery of a nation—
outside its borders, by only a small fraction of the population, and when the war’s economic and blood tolls
have not penetrated the public’s purse or heart and not
generated doses of righteous indignation—it is all the
easier to observe the coded cyberattack, or a Predator
drone strike, or the Sea Air and Land (SEAL) Team
raid, the improvised explosive device, and terrorist-piracy as the harbingers of modern warfare.
But all such characteristics are transitory—nothing
more than temporary settlement of scattered LEGO®
bricks on a child’s bedroom floor, awaiting to be reassembled into something seemingly new but reminiscent of the familiar. Historian Michael Howard wrote
that war is a “distinct and repetitive form of human
behavior [that is] intermittent, clearly defined, with
distinct criteria for success or failure.”129 These weapons, now, are used because they work, now. These
descriptions are relevant, now, because political calculations and nonmilitary considerations have conditioned decision-makers to rely on them.130 In effect,
their vogue status renders them as the “symbol of the
American approach to warfare.”131 But in the summer
of 1991, in the immediate aftermath of the Persian Gulf
War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, one could—
with equal certainty—define the “American approach
to warfare” as the fast, accurate, and massive application of American armored forces guided by satellite technology and in combination with smart bombs
and stealth aircraft, at the head of a large coalition of
willing nations, aimed and thrusted into the throats
of a vilified enemy state for limited, achievable, and
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publicly-endorsed political goals. This was, after all,
the manifestation of the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine
meant to preclude another dissatisfying, prolonged,
and protested Vietnam experience. That earlier experience, too, had its own symbols of what we should
expect modern war to be: drafts, body counts, protests,
and flowers stuffed into muzzles.
Eventually, the gain or value we attach to these
means of warfare, and what they appear to represent,
will not exceed their cost in a given circumstance—
new tools will be have to be turned to for, in essence,
the very same tasks, or missions. New descriptions
of warfare will be minted. In the mid-1990s, Bosnia
saw no such application of U.S. force mirroring the
Gulf War, and the American entry into Afghanistan in
October 2001 was defined initially by special operators
on horseback. Patton, it seems, was not all that wrong.
Conditions on the ground—the location of the enemy,
the proximity to civilian noncombatants, the terrain—
did not demand political or policy choices that would
operationalize more modern means of maneuver warfare. The political climate (fueled, at least in part, by
the personalities of key planners and policymakers) at
the time did not sustain arguments for large ground
combat forces. Fast-forwarding the clock to March
2003, and it is a different narrative yet again, but one
more resembling the first Gulf War: American troops,
led by an air campaign and armored forces, leading a
coalition to destroy the military capability and governing capacity of a vilified political foe. As Clausewitz
said, “there can therefore be little doubt that many previous ways of fighting will reappear.”132
These are not—and their proponents do not offer
them as—the absolute constants of conflict. Rather
than try to create a scientific model of war that can be
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undermined (or falsified) by a single contrary historical episode, a conceptual framework simply tries, as
Andrew Mack once wrote, to focus empirical studies
on those absolute constants:
to direct . . . attention toward particular aspects of the real
world—to distinctions and relationships which ‘common
sense’ often does not take into account. The framework
defines the necessary questions which must be asked; it
does not seek to provide automatic answers.133

In “defining the necessary questions that must be
asked,” Mack viewed frameworks as more than a tool
to critically assess a concept or proposal for how a war
should be fought or an army organized to fight it.134
Instead, frameworks should be stimuli for discussion
and fodder for debate about whether certain questions
can be asked, and—if so—if they can ever really be
answered. In some ways, they function like a paradigm
as understood by Thomas Kuhn. The framework poses
questions and problems in ways previous models left
unexplained, and funnels practitioners toward certain
kinds of investigations and interpretations of data, converging debate and limiting divergence over fundamentals. This drives research confidently toward more
nuanced, precise, and systematic inquiry in narrow,
specialized areas. The new framework achieves a critical mass, becomes accepted by the community of practice as the “criterion for choosing problems to solve,”
and in the process rejects the older, traditional view.135
Uncovering a useful framework is not merely an
impractical academic exercise. Consider the Marine
Corps’ view on theory:
To understand the Marine Corps’ philosophy of
warfighting, we first need an appreciation for the nature of
war itself—its moral, mental, and physical characteristics
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and demands. A common view of war among Marines
is a necessary base for the development of a cohesive
doctrine because our approach to the conduct of war
derives from our understanding of the nature of war.136

MOVING THROUGH AND PAST CLAUSEWITZ
The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts
and ideas that have become confused and entangled.137

Clausewitz, whose writings clearly informed the
Marine Corps philosophy, famously observed that
there are certain self-evident features of all wars: the
public passion, violence, enmity, and hate that fuel
aggression; the reasons or policy choices that justify
how the state would choose to combat its adversary, as
an expression of that public passion; and the inherent
uncertainty and probabilities (or chance) associated
with employing military force.138 These three broad
elements were usually demonstrated by the people,
the “government,” and the “military” respectively.139
Precisely who or what manifested each element,
or to what degree over time, was largely immaterial.
Clausewitz never specified whether a particular actor
was linked exclusively with a particular element.140 To
clarify this extraordinary but abstract description of
war, many scholars have offered visual illustrations—
their own metaphors, in a sense—to depict the trinity
in action. Bassford offered dueling triangles, with P
(passion), R (reason), and C (chance) labeling each
corner—what he warned might just be “Static, simplistic, and generally useless visual metaphors.”141
He argues that trinities must be overlapping and
constantly animating in order to fully capture what
Clausewitz meant his trinity to convey.142
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Michael Handel, instead, chose a Cartesian graph,
where the vertical Y axis represents the passion element, the horizontal X axis represents the reason
element—the “political aims, rational calculations”
usually expressed by the government—and a diagonal
arrow jutting out from the point of origin to the northeast. This represented the creative spirit or chance element that makes nothing in war predictable, instead
influenced by the fog, friction, and uncertainty that
accompanies combat at all scales. Handel represented
the nature of a particular war as a shifting diagonal
line that wavered between and among these hard and
fast absolute elements.143
The three elements of the trinity could just as easily
be captured in a Venn diagram, with each element
represented a single circle that overlaps, to various
degrees and perhaps over time, with the other two
element circles. The point of intersection, at which
all three elements overlap each other like a lowest
common denominator, would metaphorically represent the conflict-specific circumstances and context of
a particular time and place.
This confluence of concepts—the three-circled
Venn diagram of passion, reason, and chance—seems
consistent with Handel’s preference for describing the
nature of war (any war, or any particular time within
a particular war) as the interplay or “interaction of
the trinities of all participants.”144 The will to engage
in war, the materiel, and personnel capacity to wage
that war, and the tactical and operational choices made
during that war are derivatives of these forces. War
could not exist, he would say, without the interaction
of all three elements in this trinity.145 This seems complex, or—at least—complicated. Clausewitz did write
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that in war everything is simple, but even the simple
things are hard.146
However, if we sanctify the Clauswitizian description on the one hand, but question whether the character of conflict has really changed in any meaningful
way, or to explain what war is on the other hand,
should we not also ask whether this trinity is all there
really is to it? Was it so beautifully simple and all-consuming that no other deeper insight might be found?
Like probing the inside of the atom—what was once
thought to be the impenetrable absolute foundational
piece of matter—we might ask a more complete question: what operates inside the trinity that causes
the magnetic-like flux among its three constituent
elements?147
Taking some literary license with Clausewitz’s metaphorical descriptions of war—it is “an act of human
intercourse,” a “collision of two living forces,” and a
“clash of major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed”148—we can pose various analogies that might
help us better appreciate the richness of the nature and
the patterns in the character of war. Imagine a particle collider, for instance, like the series of large-scale
physics experiments at the European Organization for
Nuclear Research (CERN) in Switzerland. Accelerate
beams of subatomic particles like protons extremely
close to the speed of light, race them around miles of
underground tunnels, ram them together, and document the resulting explosive collision in precise infinitesimal detail and observe new kinds of fundamental
elements of nature erupt into being—an immediate
accounting of the building blocks of reality.149 Likewise,
we can ask about the fundamental building blocks
of conflict—truisms of combat at any scale, thinking
of it in terms of this bloody and dramatic collision of
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materiel and forces. What would these LEGO®-like
building bricks feel like, look like, and how do they
snap together?
Hunting for war’s truths by studying its history in
depth, width, and context is a necessary step.150 But
alone, they are insufficient. If asked to explain the fundamental or elemental nature of an American-style
criminal trial—to, say, a resident of Saudi Arabia
where Islamic Sharia law, with few formalities, no use
for reasoning by precedent, and managed by the ulama
that merges strict religious conservatism with principles of justice as the basis of a legal system,—it would
not be these three dimensions alone. Doing so would
look something like the following flawed survey. It
would begin by describing how the American rules
of evidence and procedure, the practice of common
law and stare decisis, evolved from English and Roman
jurist traditions dating back almost a millennium. It
would then discuss how most state criminal prohibitions are now encoded in a civil law-based statutory manner like that of continental Europe. It would
have to defend our federal system in which each State
maintains its own criminal code and courts. I would
then offer a full factual recitation of the investigation,
charging, and trial of—for example—O.J. Simpson
in 1995. For context, I would then place that trial of
the early days of the World Wide Web’s popularity,
a 24-hour news-cycle, recurrent racial animosities and
prejudices, and the cultural attention to popular celebrities and sports heroes seemingly brought back down
to more human and mortal terms.
Ultimately, a person nevertheless unfamiliar with
the concept of a formal criminal trial in the American
sense would still be missing a way to understand the
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“But why?” that serves as the governing principle or
purpose that makes the trial what it is.
So what else is there besides a study in depth, width,
and context? In order to identify the truisms—maxims,
proverbs, principles, adages, LEGO® bricks, what have
you—of war we can search, also, for those conditions
of warfare that seem material for any persuasive and
accurate appreciation of war. In other words, we juxtapose the physical manifestation of the action against
the social and abstract phenomenon. Keegan recognized as much when he stressed that military history
as a field of scholarship and inquiry into the human
condition is useless if it fails to observe that human
conditions: battles (including skirmishes, hand-tohand assaults, and large-scale war) are not set-piece
arrangements of value-free decisions by commanders
on horseback or hill top:
ordinary soldiers do not think of themselves, in life-anddeath situations, as subordinate members of whatever
formal military organization it is to which authority has
assigned them, but as equals within a very small group
. . . it will not be because [of leadership within or of that
group] that the group members will be begin to fight and
continue to fight. It will be, on the one hand, for personal
survival, which individuals will recognize to be bound
up with group survival, and, on the other, for fear of
incurring by cowardly conduct the group’s contempt.151

That search should be a multi-front expedition: the
perspectives of compounding relevant points of view
existing simultaneously and in concert. It is impossible to fully explain or describe the fundamental
nature of a criminal trial without relating to the function, role, and means employed by the prosecutor in
combination with (or contrasted against) the opposing
function, role, and means employed by the defense
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counsel. The defining nature of the trial would still not
be complete, though, without also relating it to the role
of the fact-finding jury drawn from the community
in which the crime occurred or the judge in his or her
role as evidentiary and procedural gatekeeper. Indeed,
the pursuit for the fundamental nature of a trial would
be blind, deaf, and mute if it did fully account for the
role that evidentiary rules play, the personalities of the
adversarial litigators, the judicial temperament of the
judge, the motives of the defendant, the demographics and experiential background of the jury pool, the
heinousness of the crime, the ability and actions of
the police when they investigated the crime, and the
perceptions, beliefs, persuasiveness, and credibility of
any witnesses. In other words, a framework for understanding the nature of trial should be a collection and
arrangement of frames, each with its own angle or lens
and with a distinct material involvement or investment in the action of litigation. Likewise, a framework
for understanding the nature of war should be a collection and arrangement of frames, each with its own
angle or lens and with a distinct material involvement
or investment in the action warfare.152
LISTENING FOR WAR’S THEME
One way to launch this multi-front expedition is to
find a starting description of the conduct that is universal and unassailable. Surgery, for instance, is a complicated set of mechanical and technical acts involving
highly trained participants, possessing expert knowledge, to amend, fix, remove, or alter some part of a
living body. As Keegan said, war comes with “distinct criteria of success or failure.”153 After surgery, the
body recovers, or it gets worse, and maybe the patient
dies. Pain continues or it goes away. The reasons for
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which a patient may need surgery, the types or categories of specialized surgeons, the capabilities of an
operating room, and the amount of recovery time are
all component elements of what makes a surgery a surgery. However, if nothing else, surgery is an activity
animated by and pursued for the desire to heal—to
remedy an ailment, injury, or disease.
Trial, too, is a set of complicated activities involving highly trained participants, possessing expert
knowledge, to prosecute or defend a person accused of
criminal misconduct in a fair, impartial, and predictable manner. The reasons for why the defendant was
investigated, accused, and brought to trial, the specific criminal statutes implicated, the amount of harm
caused, the impact on a victim and the victim’s desire
for recompense or retribution, and the facts presented
are all component elements of what makes a trial a
trial. If nothing else, a trial is an attempt to remedy an
injustice. War, as another human, collective, intermittent activity, must also have some universally acceptable common theme.
Let us propose that war’s universally-apparent
common theme is choice.154 At its most microscopic,
most personal strata, war is a choice to squeeze a trigger with just enough force to expel a bullet from an
assault rifle at another human being, or to swing an
axe blade down upon a helmeted skull, or to release
ordnance from the air, aimed at a precise point on the
earth with one purpose in mind and one outcome certain. It is a choice to have considered and labeled that
human or patch of ground as the enemy; it is a choice to
have considered that a human life or inanimate assembly of steel or concrete or brick as a threat to you or to
others whom you consider worthy of protecting; it is a
choice, indeed, to have placed oneself in a position to
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make those choices—to step inside the turret hatch of
the armored vehicle, to strap yourself into the cockpit,
to walk toward the crowded market with a detonator
in a sweaty grip; to have placed yourself in an institution that allows you to make those choices, to allow
yourself to be trained sufficiently to react and choose
almost without thinking, to allow yourself the freedom
to act with a specifically cruel intent without apology
or remorse.
Adjusting the microscope to amplify war to the
next, larger scale, war is the equality of opportunity—
the parity—of such choices. Just as you choose to aim,
breathe, squeeze the trigger and feel the recoil of the gun
against your cheek and smell the metallic sulfur wafting around you, the right to execute the same series of
considered or reflexive movements toward and against
you is felt, or could be felt, by your target. The justness
or injustice of that feeling is largely immaterial to the
present nature of the engagement. Those terms will be
defined by those not present in that moment, and will
be used to argue about the spectrum of moral rightness of not only your choices in that moment, but of
the choices of others that trained and conditioned your
body and mind to act in that moment, and the choices
of others that ordered your presence at that place and
time. But, in that moment, there is nothing but the
shared ability—and equal excuse—to hurt, damage,
terminate, immobilize, or arrest the capacity and capability of the other to define the very next moment with
the threat, or application, of violence.
Adjusting the lens further to observe larger and
coarser scales, war is the social embracing—the knowing, reckless, or negligent spreading—of this equality of opportunity of violent choices among networks
of human beings. That network may be a squad of
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six soldiers at a checkpoint suddenly alerted to the
oncoming rush of a pickup truck breaking through the
serpentine blockades meant to slow incoming traffic.
It may be the team of commando operators onboard
a stealthy aircraft, whirring through mountain passes
at midnight toward a guarded compound, adjusting
their night vision goggles and loading their rifles. It
may be the rectilinear masses of grey and blue staring
across wispy green fields and wooden fences, anticipating the long charge and fearing the concussive
blasts of artillery sure to come. It may be the pilot and
crew managing the semi-autonomous functions of a
drone buzzing high over a neighborhood half a world
away from their monitors and joysticks. It may be a
tribe defending its sacred honor against the intrusions
or insults of another tribe, or the proof of manhood or
display of chivalric nobility.
It is an aggregate collection of these choices across
all the participating networks, regardless of their size
and regardless of the duration of their choices. War can
be both Clausewitz’s “continuation of policy by other
means” accepted by an organized, bureaucratic nationstate, and Keegan’s “expression of culture, often a
determinant of culture forms, in some societies the culture itself.”155 It can be the long-debated, rationalized,
policy for one belligerent manifesting as a call to duty,
and as an instinctive, spontaneous, ritualized, or precedent-based culture for the other, simultaneously and
with no contradiction. Either case offers nothing but
case studies in choice.
At the widest aperture, without any fine-tuning of the microscope lens, war is the art of creating,
then manipulating or energizing, then restraining
that spread of the equality of opportunity to embark
on violent choices. The artists are the organizations,
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institutions, and—underlying all—individuals possessing an authority to do so. That authority may be
loud and unambiguous, spoken through laws, contracts of service, a call to arms, a declaration before
Parliament or Congress, barked orders communicated, and spreading virulently through the ranks.
Alternatively, that authority may be tacit, driven by
some sense shared among those who participate in (or
wish to participate in) those networks, large or small.
In either case, the artist’s authority to animate them is
assumed to be, and believed to be, legitimate.
CHOICE—IN ART AND WAR
Art is a noble, humanizing construction—a creative act. War is ignoble, dehumanizing destruction—
the paragon of the uncreative act.156 To place the two
in rhetorical comparison may feel uncomfortable, or
even insulting. Yet these opposite fields of ancient
human endeavor are not as completely distinct from
one another as they first seem. Producing art, painting
in particular, can serve as a metaphor of war and illuminates the key concept of choice. Winston Churchill
certainly thought so. Reflecting on his love for the act
of oil painting that was unknown to him until middle
age, he wrote:
The colors are lovely to look at and delicious to squeeze
out. Matching them, however crudely, with what you see
is fascinating and absolutely absorbing . . . As one slowly
begins to escape from the difficulties of choosing the right
colors and laying them in the right place and in the right
way, wider considerations come into view. One begins
to see, for instance, that painting a picture is like fighting
a battle . . . the principle is the same. It is the same kind
of problem as unfolding a long, sustained, interlocked
argument . . . It is a proposition which, whether of few
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or numberless parts, is commanded by a single unity of
conception.157

War, as described earlier, can be thought of as a
time-lapsed evolution of the creation, manipulation,
energizing, and restraining of the equality of opportunity to choose to act with violence, spreading among
networks, equally conscious of their ability to choose
to offend or defend, to advance or retreat, to pull the
trigger or to revolt against the order to fight or put oneself in harm’s way and the trajectory of another’s RPG.
Art, is also a mix of creativity, manipulation, energizing, and restraint. Consider the blank canvas, stretched
taut across light wooden support frames. It is empty,
waiting for the painter’s initial act, waiting for choices
to be made and color to be splashed, speckled, or dotted
on it in some organized, coherent manner, or at least
according to the design imagined in the head of the
artist staring at it. That blank canvas, like the ground
truth in war, however, is never quite without its subtle
imperfections—dimples and dirt and the stray strand
of hair that give the canvas a texture that the artist does
not sense or see immediately. Not until the artist lays
the brush on the canvas with the first planned streaks
of paint that are driven, pushed, and pulled along
some calculated route across the blank space with
an intent to build the beginning of an image, do the
unseen imperfections of the canvas affect the artist’s
half-formed notion of the final, desired end product.
Perhaps the artist, like civil and military war strategists, first sketched an outline, a preliminary drawing
on the canvas to help guide his hand, a way to keep
the artist’s mental model of the final picture intact as
the brush and paint slide over the canvas. Or, as Emile
Simpson wrote of strategy, it functions like a template,
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or a “stable interpretive structure” that enables us to
assign reasonable meaning to what would otherwise be
chaos, and we orchestrate our behavior in response.158
But, like the war planner, no artist’s intent survives
that first contact between brush and canvas. The paint
color—the choice of various means used to portray the
image—blends with other paints, still wet and sticky
and not yet fixed as fact onto the canvas. The paint
brush, the way the artist transfers the image from his
imagination to the reality of the stretched canvas, may
become too saturated to create the finer details necessary for the articulated features the artist first planned
to capture. The hog hair bristles of the brush may
loosen, fall off, and become part of the canvas’s terrain,
to be painted over and left without rescue, altering the
image in ways never anticipated by the artist’s mental
blueprint or timid, careful sketch. The lighting may
not be quite right, casting subtle shadows and clouding what needed to be pure, objective, and absolutely
committed to receiving whatever the artist plants on
the canvas. Perhaps he was interrupted, breaking his
concentration, or moments of doubt began to flutter
his nerves and force him to question his choices.
This begins the argument—the ongoing conversation between the artist’s intent and imagination, his
hand holding the brush, and the paint that has already
landed in the canvas’s fibers. The artist, like the strategist, struggles to manipulate the brush and the daubs
in a manner consistent with (or at least not inconsistent
with) his impressions of what the image or planned
outcome should have been from the start, and contrasted against what has begun to appear before him.
The artist chooses the paint color, its tint or shade,
its thickness or amount, the brush type—bushy and
wide, or sharp and surgical—and the angle of attack.
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The artist’s skill, patience, and resolve begin to affect
the nuance of the various lines and the features of the
image. Exhaustion, arrogance, or lack of deliberate concentration may smudge and blur the colors together
leaving the artist’s intended product fuzzy, indistinct,
and unrecognizable to himself.
Unsatisfied, the artist recovers and reassesses the
progress. He makes decisions to account for areas
of the canvas he wishes to alter, to smooth over, or
to leave alone. Or, just as importantly, decides to let
emotion and instinct govern and direct. New shades
are blended on the palette; the artist dips his arsenal
of brushes, new images transfer from his imagination to his physically tangible and tactile product in
front of him. Eventually, the artist must decide—must
choose—when to stop, when to restrain his mind from
imagining yet more to add to that canvas, more detail
to display, more blemishes to cover up, and when to
restrain his hand from exercising that recurring and
unceasing thought: there is always something more
that can be done. There is always something more that
can be done to render the image more aligned with the
artist’s intent, his expectations, and his self-imposed
standards.
What began as a two-dimensional, blank space in
the mind of the artist has evolved into something with
smell and texture, a third dimension, of various shades
and hues. It forms a static image that is the sum total
of the artist’s ability or willingness to hone his emotion, instinct, and plan for the paint; a static image that
will always be there, fading over long epochs of time
or to be covered by another image, but always laying
beneath the surface and staining the canvas fibers. The
artist’s work becomes part of the history of the artist,
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part of the history of the canvas, and part of the history
of whatever future portrait lays above it.159
Had the artist chosen not to purchase his stockpile
of materials, not laid them out carefully, or not chosen
the day and hour to first begin the work, there would
be no initial intent and no design from which to deviate. There would have been no tools nor setting in
which to express an emotion or ambition. There would
have been no constant debate between the intent of the
hand guiding the brush, and what the paint wished to
do on the canvas—there would have been no evolving
image taking shape. No art would have been created.
War, too, is the effect of an impulse to change the
status quo, to force a conversion or transformation
according to a will for some purpose with an acceptance
that harm will trail it as a natural byproduct (like a comet’s tail as it is orbits too close the sun), consequence,
or modus operandi. Warfare is a means by which ritual
norms between or among various networks or societies
may be followed, or a means by which to overawe an
opponent, to acquire geography for one’s own benefit,
or to force an enemy to come to terms with a future of
your design. War begins upon some space, assumed to
be blank and devoid of relevant history, but of course
never is. Almost immediately, the intent and manipulations of the belligerents—whether entire governments with massive and technologically-sophisticated
armies and navies or ad hoc, quasi-skilled rebels with
borrowed arms—is frustrated or, at least, affected by
the texture of the background on which they fight.
Weapons, tactics, personnel, leadership, operations,
strategies, and even ultimate grand designs will morph
and evolve over some period of time, whether because
of external critics or a faithful muse, or because those
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same characteristics lose their currency, break, or fail
to achieve the ambition for which they are employed.
War is not merely an expression of primitive culture, or just a modern continuation of policy. Adhering to either definition fails to answer the question:
What for? Why are cannon fired, buildings leveled,
heads scalped, fortifications razed, noncombatants
displaced or starved or killed? Why are medals given,
pensions funded, shattered limbs replaced with plastic
and metal, territorial borders redrawn, treaties made
and broken, laws enacted, the coup d’état planned,
and kings imprisoned? Why are these characteristics
expected and unchallenged consequences of war?
War is, must be, and cannot be anything other
than the chosen expression of a power motive; it is the
compliment to the notion that a painting must be, and
cannot be anything other than some expression of a
creative motive. An actor—be it a soldier, an admiral,
a statesman, or an entire nation—can express power
in any number of ways, just as an artist can depict an
image on a canvas with photorealistic detail or by mere
colorful abstract allusion. Power is expressed by influencing (that is, changing or directing) the manifested
behaviors, mental expectations, physical resources, or
the ability and opportunity to volitionally act among
other relevant parties and institutions. However, war
is a certain class of power expression: the metaphorical
flexing of a muscle or use of that muscle to inflict an
outcome that pains or threatens another. As suggested
earlier, but now enhanced with a definition of how
power is expressed, war can be described as an investment in organized violence by parties interested in
the extension or maintenance or appearance of their
power over an unspecified time, with an unknowable risk, for an uncertain reward. In that sense,
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Clausewitz was right to call war a duel and wrestling
match. There is a physicality in which belligerents are
contesting each other for supremacy by inflicting the
right amount of harm to the other.
This physical expression of power looks and
feels like what we typically describe as war—a strategic interaction of risk, reward, and death spread
unevenly across a network of participants, all sharing
that parity of opportunity and choice—when it materially advances that actor’s freedom of choice and freedom of action. To any observer witnessing the duel,
and to the wrestlers themselves, the physicality must
achieve either or both primary goals: first, the effect
of the effort is compatible or consistent with—it does
not contradict—that actor’s policy objective or cultural
precedent that originally animated the expression of
power; second, or in addition, the effect of that effort
redirects or extinguishes an adversary’s or a competitor’s actual or perceived objectives, rights, or capacity to express power in the same way—their ability to
define the next moment.
In this sense, war at the largest scale of abstraction
is the intentional attempt to negate the equality (or
simply, the unbalancing) of opportunity to express
a violent choice across multiple scales of action. It is
an effort to unbalance the parity of choice; if one side
is successful, then war was the restraint of (the other’s)
choices, by means of force. Choice, then, dominates
the discussion of war from its most prosaic and interpersonal, where politics, policy, and national survival
mean far less than immediate security, safety, and the
absence of pain, all the way to its most strategic and
abstract, where the individual needs and sacrifices of
the people affected by war in the most abrupt and private sense are subsumed by the larger and less distinct
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public aims. Retired Lieutenant General James Dubik
writes of the parallel and paralyzing effect of ambiguity and uncertainty existing at these various echelons:
Under fire, soldiers sometimes stare at their sergeants
and lieutenants for what seems eternal seconds awaiting
orders. The battlefield rarely provides the time to get more
information, to reflect a bit longer, or to understand more
completely. For a different set of reasons, time is often not
on the side of senior political leaders and generals either.
Nor do these senior leaders always have the information
they would like to have before making important and
consequential decisions. Mistakes, misjudgments, and
misunderstandings are rife at both the tactical and
strategic levels. In every war, learning takes place at both
the tactical and strategic levels.160

Like a classical fugue, choice is the musical theme
of war, replayed by many instrumental voices at varying pitches and keys over time, overlapping and interacting to create the whole structure that is observed,
heard, and witnessed by spectators—the audience
and the artists.
CLASH OF THE TRINITIES
Mathematicians think in symbols, physicists in objects,
philosophers in concepts, geometers in images, jurists in
constructs, logicians in operators, writers in impressions,
and idiots in words.161

Marvin Minsky believes that isolating a single
meaning of any concept or thing is without much profit
to those who foolishly try—just as Keegan disparaged
the effort to isolate a single meaning of war. Instead,
we define a thing’s meaning by how it relates to everything else we know; in that sense, everything worth
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considering is a hodge-podge, cornucopia of related
viewpoints.
The secret of what anything means to us depends on how
we’ve connected it to all the other things we know. That’s
why it’s almost always wrong to seek the real meaning of
anything. A thing with just one meaning has scarcely any
meaning at all.162

Minksy, one of the original pioneers of artificial intelligence research and computing, suggests that understanding something requires more than rote recitation
of a definition in a vacuum. It is a function of appreciating its meaning-network. Well-connected paths
between related and unrelated notions will “let you
turn ideas around in your mind, to consider alternatives and envision things from many perspectives.”163
Take a kaleidoscope: the colored beads inside would
naturally fall around the interior of the tube in arbitrary ways. However, the mirrors arranged inside the
tube, reflecting the light, reorient that image created
by the colored beads into a symmetrical pattern of
duplicate images that will continue to change as the
tube turns. The arbitrary and unconnected positions
of the colorful beads become connected, crystalized,
and meaningful when we connect the multiple views
offered by the angled interior mirrors to the kinetic act
of turning the cylinder.
For Minsky, intelligence is a function of many
unintelligent parts of the mind, each with its necessary
but alone insufficient role to play, networked together.
He calls these individual component parts agents.164
When these agents combine in certain ways, each
doing what they do naturally, the net result is something that appears to be the product of a thinking,
creative, rationale, deliberate intelligence—a complex
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system. Whether that complex system of actions is a
pair of human beings playing chess at a park table, a
wide receiver modifying a well-rehearsed slant route
on the football field, an airport’s never-ending and
always-adapting menu of arriving and departing
flights, or the phenomenon of an international armed
conflict triggered by one nation’s invasion of another
sovereign nation, there is value in breaking down precisely the necessary—but if left alone insufficient—
component parts. None of these activities or systems
are explainable or understandable in only the broadest of descriptive terms. To some extent, reductionism
is necessary. Rembrandt could not create his masterpieces without the paint, palette, and brushes; one
cannot describe a Renoir or Monet as simply a picture
of a haystack at sunset; one cannot define Impressionism as simply the cardinal opposite of photo-realistic
historical portraiture. However, the aesthetics of artwork and symphonies are not judged by deconstructing them into discrete parts, but rather assaying them
in context, say, of their themes.
In war, choice is the theme of a fugue played
across various strata of personalities, networks, organizations, institutions, political states, and societies.
It is manifested repeatedly (just like a fugue’s musical theme) as an investment in organized violence by
parties at every scale (from the individual to the international alliance and coalition) interested in the extension, maintenance, or appearance of their power over
an unspecified time, with an unknowable risk, for an
uncertain reward.165 Such a complex set of interrelated
conditions can be thought of as an ecological niche all
its own. This diverse ecological system of organisms
competing with each other over access to resources and
relative safety can be broken down into its own habitat
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of sixteen constituent parts or agents—each of which is
necessary, but alone insufficient, to describe war in its
most general sense or describe a particular episode of
warfare. These agents can be grouped into three general categories or bins in this ecology of war.166
War, in this ecological metaphor, is a disturbance
(like a wildfire) that varies, alters, and degrades this
ecosystem’s equilibrium using its own resources. It is
one thing to identify relevant constituent parts that play
a role in shaping every type of war, but it is another
thing to understand how those parts—like Minsky’s
agents—come together in a holistic system and give a
shape to a particular conflict. For the civil and military
strategic leaders engaged in preventing, preparing for,
waging, and recovering from a war, seeing this web is
of fundamental importance. The nature of the relationship between the civil and military elites will define
and mold the ways in which the parties use or rely on
the fuel to interact within the environment or ecology
of war. At the same time, this ecology reciprocally
defines and molds their relationship.
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Biology

Fuel

Interactions

Adversarial parties (the
Violent
Material
belligerents; need not be
resources and competition.
limited to conflict between capital.
predator and prey).
Audiences (states and
populations in surrounding community that observe the fighting).

Weapons.

Diplomatic
negotiation.

Host actors (civil polity in
which war is waged without its direct involvement
or lead).

Animating
ambitions.

Death.

Parasite actors (individuals, networks, organizations, or states that attach
themselves to the conflict
to acquire a benefit independent of the reason the
belligerents are engaged).

Publicly
pronounced
motives and
justifications.

Destruction of
resources.

Information
Threat of death or
developed by destruction of
or about the
resources.
parties.
Changes in a
belligerent’s
ability to express
power.
Changes in public
perception among
various audiences.

Table 1. The Ecology of War.
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Clausewitz described the polarity of the actors,
dividing them based on some motive of hostility with
mutually exclusive objectives. His entire approach is
based on this dialectic. His colorful descriptions of
conflict always portray war as a meeting of two or
more belligerents: war is a game of cards, a pulsation
of violence, an act of human intercourse, and a conflict of human interests. These all imply some form
of mutual strife among opposing interests beneath a
veil of uncertainty. One side attacks the other side (for
some reason, with some force, at some place); the other
side defends against the attack or attacks simultaneously, or attempts to shift its own effort to the attack.
Eventually, after several rounds in which the identity
of the attacker and defender may change, or vary at
discrete locations, there is some resolution—a victory
for one or the other (or at least perceived to be such
by relevant stakeholders and observers) or stalemate.
It takes the form of thesis-antithesis-synthesis.
Perhaps the better metaphor then is a clash of the
trinities, accounting for the conflict of interest between
two or more active participants, each acting—based on
choice—according to the internal flux of their constituent elements of passion, reason, and chance. Figure
1 below captures the essentials of this basic contact, of
course limiting it to just two belligerents for the sake
of descriptive simplicity. Adding more parties in contact (to any extent) would not substantially change the
argument this figure begins to illustrate.
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Local Horizon

Figure 1. Clash of the Trinities.
The vertical line separating the two sets of trinities
has metaphorical meaning as well. Each party or belligerent actor—again, regardless of scale or point of
view (from soldier in hand-to-hand combat to clashing armor formations to nation states’ armies and
navies)—is ad idem adversarial. Therefore, they should
be depicted as facing off across a threshold—some
line of scrimmage or a Local Horizon. This is the point
in space and time from which each side attempts to
observe, understand, influence, and interact with the
other. Beginning in 2014, when militants organized
under the flag of ISIS and led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi began their campaign to capture territory from
poorly governed areas of northwestern Iraq and eastern Syria, the West—in both ideological and military
opposition—struggled to understand the nature of
this belligerent. In violently capturing and governing
towns that had been previously liberated from Saddam
Hussein, then later patrolled by an Iraqi Army paid
for and rebuilt by Americans after Saddam’s fall, the
West initially viewed ISIS as little more than an ambitious offshoot of al-Qaeda. However, when this militia
began resembling a modern army, survived targeted
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air strikes from bombers and drones, began collecting taxes, recruited citizens a world away inspired by
ISIS’s goal of returning the world to the 7th century,
enforcing laws in its conquered territory, and formally
established a caliphate, the horizon line between what
the West wanted to believe about its new enemy and
what that enemy itself did was indeed quite long, wide,
and shrouded by fog.
In this sense of representing a fog or haze of
war, the Local Horizon may also represent the
source (or at least a source) of Clausewitz’s friction:
the danger, exertion, and uncertainty (moral or
physically manifested) that generate a case-by-case
“climate of war.”
Consequently, this metaphor can help describe
the quality of the relationship that evolves over time
between or among parties, ranging from filtered (in
the sense of being pure and benign, as between allies
or confederates), to fragile, to fractured. At the very
least, it represents the natural, unavoidable opacity of
humans interacting at virtually any scale, from interpersonal conversation to the maneuvering of armed
forces on a battlefield.
The nexus of each Venn diagram can represent the actual effect, subjectively felt by and
objectively observed, of each party-in-contact’s
idiosyncratic and context-specific mixing or balancing of the three tendencies Clausewitz first
identified as “suspended between three magnets.”
For simplicity’s sake in digging into this trinity, we
can visually represent that nexus with its own standalone circle. Each circle would, in essence, capture all
sixteen fundamental elements described earlier as the
making up the ecology of war, as each of those necessary but alone insufficient elements are intrinsic to the
characteristic attributes of each of the three essential
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tendencies of passion, reason, and chance (as usually
manifested by the people, the government, and the
military). This focus on each belligerent’s trinity nexus
is shown in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2. Trinity Nexus.
But, as Clausewitz suggests, common sense
demands, and history demonstrates, the forces
or tendencies that constitute the trinity are
variable in their relationship to one another.
In other words, they are not static over time, over
geography, or across the range of human emotions and
decisions that drive the ongoing action in a war at each
and every strata of human or institutional perspective, “every war is rich in unique episodes. Each is an
unchartered sea, full of reefs.”167
Clausewitz advocated for looking at war, then, as
caveated by probabilities rather than determinism or
absolutes. Amending our diagram further to reflect
this importance of probabilities, we should represent
each belligerent’s trinity nexus with a dashed line
reflecting its variability that so much depends on context (see Figure 3).
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Local Horizon

Figure 3. Variable Trinity Nexus.
LEGITIMIZING CONFLICT: LET ROBBERS
BECOME KNIGHTS
Continuing with exploring how deeply we can penetrate or explain Clausewitz’s concept of the trinity, we
should pay homage to his classic and mostly-understood argument about war’s relationship to politics or
policy. War is a “true political instrument,” “politics
is the womb in which war develops,” war is “only a
branch of political activity . . . it is in no sense autonomous,” it is a “continuation of political intercourse,
carried on with other means” or “with the addition of
other means,” the “policy objective determine both the
military objective and the amount of force to be used,”
policy is the “guiding intelligence” operating the “aim
of war,” the “political purpose” is what one intends to
achieve by the war and “prescribes the scale and means
of effort” devoted to it, wars vary “with the nature of
their [political] objectives and the situations which
give rise to them.”168 As David Kaiser summarized it:
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“politics establishes the value of the object of the conflict and thus profoundly influences the level of effort
that will be devoted to achieving it.”169
However, maybe the Prussian general was too limited in his analysis. Mentioned earlier, his view was
unfortunately influenced too heavily by the nation-onnation warfare of mostly-professionalized militaries,
controlled by political authorities of various stripes
and ideologies, and energized by largely perceived
historical travesties or affronts to national honor and
by geographic and territorial ambitions unique to early
19th-century Europe. Keegan is perhaps more perceptive on the matter: that culture ultimately drives individuals, tribes, societies, and nations to confront one
another violently and that nonmaterialist and irrational motives may form the base drives and specific
casus belli.170 Drew Gilpin Faust, for example, wrote of
the American Civil War:
Slavery gave the war’s killing and dying a special meaning
for black Americans; the conflict was a moment for both
divine and human retribution, as well as an opportunity
to become the agent rather than the victim of violence . . .
it was an act of personal empowerment and the vehicle
of racial emancipation. To kill and to be, as soldiers,
permitted to kill was ironically to claim a human right.171

Killing and dying for human rights has, of course, a
long history. In a green valley of south-central France,
with dormant volcanoes along its western edge, Pope
Urban II presided over a council of bishops and aristocrats outside the town of Clermont in November 1095
that led to a bellicose eruption of war fervor and fever
that would dramatically recast the balance of power
in Europe and the Middle East. Marshaling all of his
available oratorical ability and the image of himself as
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God’s mouthpiece on Earth, Urban urged his listeners
to reaffirm their pledge to the “Truce of God,” to abate
the lawlessness and barbarity of that period through
order, security, and Christ-abiding peace:
If anyone seizes or robs monks, or clergymen, or nuns,
or their servants, or pilgrims, or merchants, let them
be anathema. Let robbers and incendiaries and all
their accomplices be expelled from the church and
anathematized . . . you have seen for a long time the great
disorder in the world caused by these crimes. It is so bad
in some of your provinces, I am told, and you are so weak
in the administration of justice, that one can hardly go
along the road by day or night without being attacked by
robbers; and whether at home or abroad one is in danger
of being despoiled either by force or fraud.172

The Pope then persuasively—if hypocritically to
our modern sensibilities—urged Christian Europe to
take up arms and rush to their brothers in the Near
East “in urgent need” of their help. Byzantine Emperor
Alexius I had requested military support from the
Pope not long before, to stem the spread of the Seljuq
Turks in Asia Minor encroaching upon what remained
of the Eastern Holy Roman Empire. Claiming that the
Muslim Turks had “devastated the Kingdom of God,”
Urban invented and embellished tales of how the
Arabs and Turks stole the land of Christian families,
destroyed churches, and worshipped demons:
I, or rather the Lord, beseech you as Christ’s heralds
to publish this everywhere and persuade all people of
whatever rank, foot-soldiers and knights, poor and rich,
to carry aid promptly to those Christians and to destroy
that vile race from the lands of our friends . . . Christ
commands it, 173
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he implored. In closing, the Pope sweetened his call to
arms with a promise: “All who die by the way, whether
by land or by sea, or in battle against the pagans, shall
have immediate remission of sins.”174 He continued, in
a savvy and strategic appeal to redirect internal European violence outward toward Islam:
let those who have been accustomed unjustly to wage
private warfare against the faithful now go against the
infidels . . . let those who for a long time, have been
robbers, now become knights. Let those who have been
fighting against their brothers and relatives now fight in
a proper way against the barbarians . . . as soon as winter
is over and spring comes, let them eagerly set out on the
way with God as their guide.175

Thus he launched the First Crusade. The Pope,
hoping to reenergize the authority, influence, or prestige of the Catholic Church, had legitimized the popular use of mass violence, moving it away from unjust
private warfare of greed between Christians that had
ravaged Western Europe for years, toward a “just”
and holy war to reclaim the wealthy lands of the East,
freeing the (allegedly) enslaved and tortured, while
punishing an alien and demonized people, and earning a place in Heaven as one’s reward. Though, as
historian of the Crusades Thomas Asbridge notes, the
Pope’s rhetoric “bore little or no relation to the reality
of Muslim rule in the Near East,” he had legitimized an
armed pilgrimage that would lead to centuries of grief
and bloodshed: a war of swords and words between
cultures and creeds.176
It seems reasonable to suggest that either type of
motive—rational, rule of law-based, intermittent or
ritualized, emotive, and culturally accepted—erects a
sense of hardened legitimacy to the conflict, combat,
or war. Whether the “guiding intelligence” is the
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bureaucratic product of civil administrators acting
with a warrant to wage war from the solemn declaration of public officials, or is a long-held traditional
and ceremonial rite of raiding the weaker neighboring tribes to acquire slave-prisoners from which to
appease a deity by human sacrifice,177 the legitimizing
womb (in Clausewitz’s words) serves a unique function. It socializes the participants into adopting a norm
of conduct and attitude that is collectively obeyed as
rightful, valid, acceptable, and not simply the crime of
organized, serial murder.
In the Figure 4 below, the dashed box represents
this Legitimizing Frame.

Figure 4. Legitimizing Frame.
It is best drawn as a dashed line rather than a solid
one, because the arguments that justify the conflict
between and among the belligerents are variable and
flexible. They may change over the course of a conflict,
like the U.S.-led coalition’s reason for occupying Iraq
evolved between 2003 and 2011. The reasons that legitimized the conflict in the hearts and eyes of the participants on day 1 may have shifted by day 100, and
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most certainly by day 1,000. Moreover, these reasons
may be less than transparent or hazily defined to some
of the participants, even if they represent the same
belligerent party. As Colin Gray put it, “the ‘political
object’ may well not be stable and certain, but rather
fuzzy and shifting outcomes of a continuous (political)
process.”178
Finally, these legitimizing rationales, in many
cases, will differ from one belligerent to the next.
Party A may have established a clear policy rationale
of fighting a limited and tightly-controlled counterinsurgency campaign within a host nation and with that
nation’s tacit or conditional approval; yet, the insurgents of Party B are fighting a war of survival—using
any and all means to disrupt, disorganize, and disenchant Party A and, as a result, simply outlasting them.
Merely continuing to exist, at some point, means victory for the insurgent and justifies the weapons and
tactics they employ and the sacrifices they are willing
to make.179 This same variability in what legitimizes the
use of armed force can affect the relationship between
allies too—in some cases, having distinct visions of
what purpose to pursue and want means to use. Alexius I, for example, when he petitioned the Pope in 1095,
merely hoped for a few thousand Frankish mercenaries that he could employ against the Turks at will.
For the Franks, on the other hand, their departure for
the East was a “devotional expedition sanctioned by
Rome, focused first and foremost upon the defense of
re-conquest of sacred territory.”180
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A BOUNDED HORIZON: MEANS, MOTIVE, AND
OPPORTUNITY
This sense of legitimization of the conflict (however a belligerent interprets it) does not spontaneously
spring forth into being from a vacuum. Instead, the
actors involved find themselves performing against a
larger backdrop or stage. This stage is constructed of
factual circumstances that may be uncontrolled and
even unknown to the actors, much as the blueprints
for the design of a theater set are immaterial to the
actor’s technique for memorizing his lines and reciting
them in front of the audience. Yet, they establish the
boundaries for where he stands, where he walks, and
they erect the inanimate objects he encounters along
the way. This stage, then, represents the maximum
possible or absolute extent of the parties’ combined
intent, resources, and availability. We can label this the
“Bounded Horizon Frame,” and it is somewhat akin to
Michael Porter’s notion of a business’s “productivity
frontier.” That concept represents the hypothetical
sum of all existing best practices at any given time . . .
[or] the maximum value that a company delivering a
particular product or service can create at a given cost,
using the best available technologies, skills, management
techniques, and purchased inputs.181

To form a particular conflict’s Bounded Horizon
Frame, three ingredients standout as the most potent:
intent, resources, and availability. Intent is the actor’s
point at which their energy is aimed—the actor’s driving interest or purpose. Intent is composed of two
kinds of signatures: first, as the actor’s goal, as in my
intent is to strike you across the face with my white
glove for the insult to my family’s honor; second, as a
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state of mind, as in I strike you intentionally, on purpose, not carelessly or by accident. Of course, goals
and mind states are related. If my goal is to hurt you,
and my subsequent action accomplishes it, there is
perfect accord between mens rea and actus reus. One
can deduce (or infer) a party’s goal by observing their
actions and concluding what intentions they express.
Both forms of intent are based on a system of values
that prioritizes one’s sequence of actions and choices.
Those values—whether humanitarian, secular, religious, economic, or ideological—prioritizes the actor’s
collection of related and unrelated interests in a way
that leaves fighting, over something, by force as the
chosen course of action.
Second, resources—in contrast to intent—are the
tangible elements that include the money, material,
personnel, and means of transport and communication that can be devoted at any particular time or location to animate that actor’s intent. Third, availability
simply means an occasion or prospect: the time and
permissive conditions in which to flex or operationalize one’s intent, using one’s resources. This is a way of
saying that each belligerent operates no better than the
maximum possible ideal given their tryptic of means,
motive, and opportunity—the bounded absolute frontier in Porter’s terms.
The rectangular box in Figure 5, representing the
Bounded Horizon Frame, is solid because—in contrast to the politically and socially-driven Legitimizing
Frame—it is in a large sense quantifiable (in the sense
of resources) and objectively definable from at least one
belligerent’s point of view (in the sense of the stated
intent and opportunity to act). It is the sum of these
means, motives, and opportunities that brackets or
frames this outer limit. It encapsulates the belligerents,
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how they perceive each other across the Local Horizon,
and in which the belligerents’ policy choices generate
an always-flexible and evolving Legitimizing Frame of
reference.

Figure 5. Bounded Horizon Frame.
AUTHENTICITY
However, even this outer limit, or stage on which
the actors play their parts, is not quite the authentic reality in which the belligerents battle out their
aggressions and adjust their goals. Clausewitz wrote
that action in war is like “movement in a resistant
element” or walking through a pool of water.182 No
action emerges pristine from the paper on which it was
planned, because the ability to accurately gauge the
impact of (even if we rightly account for it at all) the
weather, the strain on equipment and soldiers, physical effects of being wounded, sheer dumb luck, and the
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fallibility of weighing risks, especially when humans
weigh those risks after experiencing all of these other
dangers, is imperfect and partial.183 In other words, we
never see with perfect vision (nor implement with perfect dexterity) what resides at or on the Bounded Horizon. The painting we produce is never quite the art we
first planned.
On the smallest of scales, consider how a company
of combat engineers was caught unprepared to survive
a mortar barrage. Despite long experience with incoming indirect fire, the Sappers had grown complacent
and unquestioning of the policies and standard operating procedures that allowed them to sleep and recover
from missions in steel, recycled shipping containers,
arranged neatly in rows and columns, with no overhead cover, no barricades of tall concrete Jersey-style
barriers or stacks of sandbags to cushion against concussions or shell fragments. When mortars finally hit
their forward operating base with accuracy on a late
afternoon on a cool Iraqi January, the dazed, confused,
and bloodied Sappers had to run half-dressed outside
to underground bunkers, or to their steel Armored Personnel Carriers—also parked neatly in rows as if still
in their motor pool at Fort Carson, Colorado. After 8
months of surviving near-misses, and gratefully avoiding roadside bomb fatalities, the expected came unexpectedly like a thunderous bass drum that deafened
ears, mucking the sky with black smoke, and shaking
soldiers with mad surges of adrenalin.184 The pin-prick
attack—in the context of the much wider war—by
an unobserved “mad mortar-man” hidden away in
densely-packed palm groves and orchards, just outside the city of Balad, was a near-perfect metaphor
of (and foreshadowing for) the awkward, straining,
uncertain development and application of American
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counterinsurgency tactics (and strategy) over the next
half-decade.185
On a larger scale, the battleships of Pearl Harbor
on an otherwise quiet morning in 1941, that were also
aligned in parked formation at their docks and succumbed to an aerial attack, prove that the Sappers
of Company B, 4th Engineer Battalion in early 2003
shared a long lineage of hubris, undiagnosed vulnerability, and a faulty weighing of risk with the sailors,
commanders, admirals, and political leaders at the
beginning of an engagement with a very different kind
of warfare. Neither numbers, nor skilled training, nor
technology, nor the best laid plans ever overcome the
natural, unavoidable resistance factor of war. This is
what Clausewitz meant by the “friction that distinguishes real war from war on paper.”186 The actors’
real-world extent of their resources at a given moment,
the real-world scope of their opportunities, and the
ever-varying intent (as in their goals and mental
state) is something distinct and smaller than what the
Bounded Horizon draws out as the blueprint for the
conflict’s theater stage. As David Kaiser observed,
“domestic and international conditions determine not
only a state’s objectives, but the extent of the resources
the state would be able to commit to them.”187 In both
the case of Company B’s Sappers and the Pacific Fleet,
our initial sensitivity to external conditions conditioned our conduct. Later, reality—through terms initially defined by the enemy—recast our sensitivity to
those external, authentic conditions, and our conduct
and planning adjusted.
To represent this more realistic view, we need a
new frame. This frame does not replace the Bounded
Horizon Frame altogether, for that still works to inflate
or capture all of the actors’ expectations or desires, like
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a library, archive, vault, arsenal, or source from which
they believe they can generate their plans and design
their conduct. This new frame should consist of the
belligerent actors’ actual observations and sensitivities
to true (not just idealized, planned, or maximum possible) conditions unfolding around them over time—
in part external to them and perhaps even shaped by
their ongoing conduct.
In Figure 6, the “Authentic Conditions Frame” is
depicted as the darker dashed box laying somewhere
between the Legitimizing Frame and the Bounded
Horizon Frame.

Figure 6. Authentic Conditions Frame.
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MODERATION AND RESTRAINTS:
A RUCKSACK FULL OF WEIGHTS
Following Clausewitz’s thinking, there are forces
that moderate or dampen the inclination of the parties to naturally escalate to the “extremes”—Clausewitz’s theoretical total war—that limit their energies,
preventing conflict from approaching too closely to
its self-destructive potential. He named many factors
contributing to this moderation: that each party could
only be an imperfect realization of its own ideal, that
war is a sequential series of cause and effect oscillating among the parties, human nature’s tendency to
avoid maximum effort, that war has a discontinuous
tempo—action is followed by long periods of inactivity based, at least in part, on an imperfect knowledge
of the enemy’s own actions.188
War, regardless of its scale or society, also gets
curbed by human-imposed rules, laws, or conventions.
While civil means of dispute resolution between belligerents are not featured prominently in their armed conflict, it is not true that silent enim leges inter arma (in times
of war, the law falls silent). The Aztec empire’s flower
wars—whether meant to serve as training grounds for
nobles, a market for acquiring prisoners to sacrifice
to the gods, or as a less costly way to slowly attrit the
enemy—were conducted according to ritualized codes
that regulated the weapons, number of soldiers on the
field, and the location and time of battle.189 Hammurabi conditioned his Babylonian Army to restrain itself
from harming cities he attacked if the city opened its
gates without confrontation, thereby sparing the population.190 The Late Bronze Age wars in Mesopotamia
featured formal declarations of war to precede actual
hostilities, lest the pugnacious kings offend the gods.
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Cicero, the great Roman orator in the age of Julius
Caesar and the death of the Republic, wrote that “there
is a limit to retribution and to punishment,” and our
first duties are to abide by “fundamental principles
of justice:” that “no harm be done to anyone; second,
that the common interests be preserved.” Therefore, he
wrote, “no war is just, unless it is entered upon after
an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted
or warning has been given and a formal declaration
made.”191
Rules that curtail violence during war can also be
found in monotheistic preaching. In the Book of Deuteronomy, it is said that Moses warned the Israelites to
offer peace before sacking a city, and to restrain themselves from attacking sources of food and shelter, as
well as women and children (ostensibly because they
revert to property of the conquering people and should
not be wasted so flippantly).192 Likewise, the 7th-century caliph, Abu Bakr, announced “ten rules for your
guidance on the battlefield,” prohibiting mutilation,
treachery, killing of women, children, and the elderly,
and avoiding wanton destruction of the environment
or the enemy’s food supply.193
At the request of President Lincoln, the Lieber Code
of 1863—drafted by a jurist whose three sons fought
on different sides in the American Civil War—was
intended to formalize rules for the behavior of soldiers
on the battlefield. Adhering to the Just War tradition
of Cicero and Aquinas, Dr. Francis Lieber wrote: “The
ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed state
of peace.”194 Therefore, he concluded, “the law of war
imposes many limitations and restrictions on principles of justice, faith, and honor.”195 This basic precept
drove the many prohibitions and caveats that his Code,
soon adopted into General Orders No. 100, Instructions
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for the Government of Armies of the United States, in the
Field. Among its many proscriptions, it speaks to scrupulousness in war:
The law of war does not only disclaim all cruelty and bad
faith concerning engagements concluded with the enemy
during the war, but also the breaking of stipulations
solemnly contracted by the belligerents in time of peace,
and avowedly intended to remain in force in case of
war between the contracting powers. It disclaims all
extortions and other transactions for individual gain; all
acts of private revenge, or connivance at such acts.196

In addition, “Men who take up arms against one
another in public war do not cease on this account to
be moral beings, responsible to one another and to
God.”197 Furthermore, the Code reminds soldiers that
the “unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will
admit.”198 The Code also speaks to safeguarding what
can be secured of the symbols of civilization from the
consequences of war:
Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or
precious instruments, such as astronomical telescopes, as
well as hospitals, must be secured against all avoidable
injury, even when they are contained in fortified places
whilst besieged or bombarded.199

Armies, according to the Code, could only seize private property if demanded by military necessity.200
To cement a civilizing sensibility over the more aggressive instincts and fear understandably present among
those fighting wars, the Code established that:
All wanton violence committed against persons in
the invaded country, all destruction of property not
commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all
pillage or sacking, even after taking a place by main
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force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such
inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or
such other severe punishment as may seem adequate for
the gravity of the offense.201

Today, those moderating regulations are found in
the so-called Law of War, found in statutes, treaties,
military regulations, and customary international law,
divided between jus ad bellum and jus in bello rules
and expectations. For example, Article 22 of the Hague
Conventions of 1907, states, “the right of belligerents to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”202
On a larger scale, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928
aggressively banned, for the first time in history,
aggressive war fought for reasons other than self-defense and served as a legal basis for prosecuting war
criminals after World War II. Thomas Aquinas first
argued that only three conditions, if met, could excuse
the resort to war in the first place (jus ad bellum): it
must be for a just purpose (i.e., not for pure selfish
gain), waged by a proper authority, and restoration
of the peace must be the motive for using force.203 The
United Nations Charter, Article 2(4), continued that
tradition of moderating the resort to force, containing
it within certain boundaries—the right of self-defense
being the most operative. When nations do go to war,
or engage in armed conflict, the legal precept of proportionality that customary international law experts
believe is encoded by the United Nations Charter,
demands that nations limit the magnitude, duration,
and scope of their force, capping it to a level which is
reasonably necessary to counter an attack or threat to
their political sovereignty, territorial integrity, or their
citizens, but no more.
As for the means and methods of warfare, laws
continue to erect rigid and formal limitations on what
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can be used by belligerents against one another. The
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention of 1980
prohibits the use of weapons that when detonating
or impacting a person, leave undetectable fragments
because they cause unnecessary suffering, as well as
certain booby traps and mines because they cannot
effectively discriminate or distinguish between the
combatant and noncombatant civilian.204 Poisons, specifically chemical weapons, are forbidden via the 1925
Geneva Gas Protocol and the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention treaty. The Geneva Conventions hold that
all parties to a conflict must:
at all times distinguish between the civilian population
and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations
only against military objectives.205

Modern militaries vigorously train their soldiers on
who can be shot at, with what kinds of weapons, when,
and where.206 These rules of engagement are intended
to restrain the use of military means and methods of
targeting, limiting attacks to those based on military
necessity, imploring troops to distinguish accurately
between combatants and civilian noncombatants, to
use force proportional to the need, and to avoid causing “unnecessary suffering.”207
These moderating influences and curbs on conduct—both before a war breaks out between nations
or armed groups, and during hostilities between the
actors on the field, in the air, at sea, or on the city street—
act as bounds on behavior. They, to continue with the
image of frames within frames, act as other artificial
constraints that limit the maximum exertion possible
by the parties engaged in the conflict. For humanitarian
and practical reasons, they, in consequence, compress
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inward upon the authentic conditions frame: the effect
felt by the parties is that their tactical (and perhaps strategic) options are narrowed and choices are guarded by
laws, regulations, customs, and courtesies that extend
between the belligerents. As those options narrow and
choices shrink, the authority that legitimizes the resort
to violence feels the squeeze too—if a nation cannot
legally go to war aggressively to assert dominion over
the sovereign territory of another nation, but chooses
to anyway, the justifications it can and will employ to
marshal the will, passion, and resources of the nation
to that end, and to explain itself to the audience of other
nations, will be carefully chosen, as will the choice of
which (if any) potential allies to court.
The result, using this imagery of the clashing trinities, is depicted in Figure 7—a series of encapsulating, Matryoshka-like, frames that dilate or distend,
and when compressed, shrivel and tighten. One way
to visualize this dilation and pulsing, compression
and contraction, is by thinking of the armed conflict—
described by this set frames housing clashing trinities—is a system undergoing changes in its entropy.
Generally, entropy is a way to describe the amount of
disorder in a system, or the potential ways in which
the system’s components might arrange themselves.
Systems with high entropy are very disordered—more
information is required to fully account for everything going on, overcoming the system’s decaying
tendency toward complete randomness; systems with
low entropy are calmer. Adding heat to a system, say
a tray of ice cubes, generally adds to the molecular disturbances inside and rearranges them with more and
more randomness, melting it, until an otherwise static
and rigid state is phase changed into a liquid and then
a highly-shapeless gas.
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Figure 7. The Clashing Trinities.
It might be the case that moderating laws, rules,
and regulations governing how military forces interact
with civilians they encounter would add more order,
or stability, to the overall conflict. From the point of
view of the noncombatant civilians, the military’s
menu of choices are constrained, limiting the amount
of violence and uncertainty to which the civilians are
subjected, cooling the conflict into a more structured
and predictable shape. However, from the point of
view of the belligerent parties and their armies, those
same laws, rules, and regulations might be viewed,
instead, as risking (or causing) more disorder and
less stability. Party A may not have any assurance
that Party B will abide by those restrictions and fight
civilized. Or, as was the case when General Stanley
McChrystal imposed stronger cautionary steps in
the rules of engagement, when he took command in
Afghanistan, to reduce the risk to civilian casualties,
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those limitations might be seen as narrowing the range
of resources each bellicose party might wield with its
military to affect a given political goal.208 With a limited range of resources, that party’s willingness or
ability to maintain its initial objectives may degrade,
imposing insecurity and uncertainty about what ways
are available to meet their strategic ends. From that
perspective, the aspect of the Bounded Horizon Frame
that compresses or constricts their activities actually
increases pressure, adding heat and, therefore, disorder or entropy.209
And, as the authentic conditions on the ground
constantly shift under the feet of the belligerent parties—sometimes to their advantage and sometimes not
so much—this frame too can be thought of in terms of
its entropy, or tendency toward disorder. The same is
generally true of the legitimizing motivations and reasons that animate the parties—the policy objective or
guiding intelligence, or cultural norm or fanatical religious fervor, that inspires populations to take up arms
for a cause, or warrants a government to declare its
hostility toward another, or to solve a political conundrum through the application or threat of violence. It
is probably sufficient to conclude, without worry of
too much contradictory evidence, that the publicly
announced justification for the public “investment
of violence” that initially launches battleships, sends
flight crews scrambling, and produces deployment
orders and movement timelines is rarely motionless.
As described earlier, it pulsates as conditions on the
ground—politically, socially, or militarily—actually
change or appear to change. As those conditions naturally and unavoidably evolve, the fuel that fired the
commitment to this risky venture in armed violence
might dry up before the political or social objective is
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satisfied if it is not stirred or mixed with more combustible fuel. Therefore, what usually begins as a well-defined or well-confined legitimizing rationale usually
unfolds into a more chaotic and varied jumble of overlapping or even contradictory agendas and goals.
The longer the conflict occurs, the greater the
chance to observe the disordering, entropic effect of its
two corollaries. The further back in time the original
spark recedes from the memory of those leading the
war effort or fighting in it, the greater the likelihood
that more voices will question the original justifications and offer new, competing ways to legitimize the
investment in violence that justifies the risk. Second, the
greater the chance that both military and political-civil
leadership that began the conflict will have rotated out
through elections, retirements, resignations, and firings. In other words, the Legitimizing Frame suffers
from the decay of old age, and continually fends off
the disease of discontinuity. The U.S.-led war in Iraq
and Afghanistan is the longest, most recent, and most
publicly debated proof of this concept in practice.
SOLVING FOR ENTROPY
If entropy is the tendency toward disorder, confusion, chaos, and discontinuity brought on by the natural elements in this ecology of war, it would be natural
to assume that all conflict will, given enough time,
rend, rip, disassemble, and scatter all sense of organization, limitations, and bounds. Of course, this is not
true. Wars eventually end. Sometimes they burn out
from exhaustion of resources or will, or suffer abrupt
changes in political goals or from the intervention of
an external friend or foe with the ability and intention
of enforcing a peace. No war, as Clausewitz knew, ever
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becomes its absolute form and one can only envision
this now as a global thermonuclear exchange between
two superpower belligerents, each with its own retinue
of allies and associates, deliberately and knowingly
investing in this form of mutual suicide. That version
of frame dilation seems as terribly unlikely as to be
impossible in practice, unless a less-absolute version
occurs through mistake, accident, or reckless abandon.
Moreover, the means, methods, and objectives relied
on by the parties engaged in this mutual investment
in violence with an uncertain risk for an unknown
reward consistently reflect the practice of imposing (or
at least attempting it) order and stability.
This sense of order and stability does not necessarily mean calm tranquility and a return to livable
peace—though this may be the ultimate end state
and goal each side may seek. Instead, the parties—the
political and military elements that make up the trinity of clashing interests—naturally resort to methods
that seek to calcify or arrest the disorder that each of
them paradoxically already initiated or encouraged.
There is a simple reason why this occurs at every scale
(recall the earlier need to view conflict from the perspectives of compounding relevant points of view
existing simultaneously and in concert—a fugue) from
the individual soldier and squad, to the destroyer captain, to the flight leader, to the allied land component
commander to the legislative body that authorizes
the use of force, to the cleric that incites a crusade or
jihad, to the president and senior advisors watching a
high-definition live feed of a special operations raid.
Doing so increases their belief that they might satisfactorily understand the threat, know their enemy, and
apply an economical (where the benefit outweighs the
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cost) and judicious (in their minds: fair, humane, legal)
amount of violent force.
As discussed earlier, choice is the common theme
that permeates each strata of war and makes warfare
appear, by analogy, as a fugue. The multi-layered
ensemble of civil and military orchestra members
choose, to various degrees knowingly and deliberately, to engage in this effort to retard, arrest, or calcify
the natural onslaught of war’s entropy. It is this effort,
in part, that makes the authentic conditions frame
fluctuate. For example, an attack helicopter pilot with
a band of suspected insurgents in his gun sights, presumably emplacing an improvised explosive device on
the side of a road, chooses whether to follow an order
to engage with lethal rounds, chooses to fire a warning
shot, chooses to buzz low overhead to either deter or
improve his visibility of the suspects, or chooses to call
in infantry to close with the enemy. But each of those
optional choices are weighed by the pilot (or provided
to him) by factors that tell him how, when, where, and
why to use violent force. Those factors are found in
his technical manuals, flight doctrines, training experiences, and admonitions from previous instructors,
orders from his commander, guidance from published
rules of engagement, and his own judgment about
the necessity, proportionality, and morality of pulling the trigger. Each of these intends to impose order,
structure, and predictability to his decision-making in
the face of a disordered, chaotic, risky, and uncertain
combat environment.
Likewise, consider the battalion commander in her
tactical command post listening to the pilot’s radio
communications, watching the event occur in real time
from video footage relayed by onboard cameras, and
monitoring the activities of several infantry companies
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in the vicinity of the suspected insurgents. That commander’s choices—order the pilot to engage or disengage, maneuver infantry closer in, strike the site with
artillery, call for host-nation military support—are
weighed by the commander (or provided to her) by
doctrine she learned in school and experiences at training centers or past mistakes (or successes) in the current deployment, as well as guidance from her higher
headquarters, advice from her staff, her informed judgment of the threat, the rules of engagement, and how
this engagement fits within the larger plan of operation or mission that her battalion is executing. As with
the pilot, each of these intends to add clarity, structure,
order, and predictability to a chaotic and uncertain
situation.
Each of these two perspectives, related in objective
and in their choices but different in scale, are essentially reactive. The pilot and commander are responding to a threat that may have been foreseeable but not
necessarily predicted. But the same function of choice
and same role for calcifying, or arresting, entropy
apply to prospective, preemptive, or planned uses of
armed violence—indeed, probably more categorically
and clearly. Consider two illustrations of this in military terms: doctrine and planning.
Doctrine is like a military’s paradigm.210 It is the
authoritative mass of “fundamental principles by
which the military forces or elements thereof guide
their actions.”211 For the U.S. Army,
doctrine is a body of thought on how Army forces
operate as an integral part of a joint force . . . Doctrine
acts as a guide to action rather than a set of fixed rules
. . . [and] doctrine establishes the Army’s view of the
nature of operations, the fundamentals by which Army
forces conduct operations, and the methods by which

87

commanders exercise mission command . . . doctrine
also serves as the basis for decisions about organization,
training, leader development, materiel, soldiers, and
facilities . . . [and] establishes a common frame of reference
and a common cultural perspective to solving military
problems.212

The Army disseminates this body of thought by publishing a menu of doctrine publications, doctrine
reference publications, field manuals, technical publications, as well as through curricula at various branch
schools, like the Basic Officer Leader Course and Captains Career Course at the Maneuver Center of Excellence (formerly known as the Infantry School and
Armor School). Later in an officer’s career, ascending
in rank and responsibility, attendance at the service
War College will further educate or train that officer
to apply principles and known standards in light of
larger strategic goals and historical or political context.
Ultimately, this body of professionalized knowledge,
standard operating procedures, and time-tested tactics
exist to help them to assemble, collect, and organize
facts into a coherent perspective or understanding of
the hostile environment around them. This serves to
justify the choices those commanders will make during
conflict as they manage the means of violence in which
others—interested in the extension, maintenance, or
appearance of their power over an unspecified time,
with an unknowable risk, for an uncertain reward—
will invest.
Planning, too, serves this calcifying role. The U.S.
Army, particularly proud of its institutional grasp of
the importance of planning, remarks (coincidently, in
its doctrine) that:
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Planning is the art and science of understanding a
situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out
effective ways of bringing that future about. Army leaders
plan to create a common vision among subordinate
commanders, staffs, and unified action partners for the
successful execution of operations.213

Rather than continually adapt on the fly and allow
circumstances to dictate one’s behavior and use of
resources, “planning helps commanders understand
and develop solutions to problems, anticipate events,
adapt to changing circumstances, task-organize the
force, and prioritize efforts.”214 In other words, plans
levy clarity, purpose, and structure so that military
forces can safely enter into situations that are uncertain, risky, and dangerous, while still applying an
amount of violent force, preferably in a degree of its
own choosing, in order to impose its will and affect the
choices available to its opposing foe.
Therefore, we see that planning and doctrine—a
mental and social activity on the one hand, and a body
of thought that organizes and provides a method for
engaging in that mental, social, activity—serve to arrest
or calcify the natural entropy of war. That entropy,
again, is a way of describing the consequences of
how actors at each level or strata of conflict—from the
individual to units to armies to collective nations and
societies—manipulate (by constricting and dilating)
the legitimizing justifications or rationales, and the
authentic conditions affecting micro and macro decision-making: the means, motives, and opportunities
that determine how, when, and why parties chose to
invest in armed violence against one another. It is this
critical relationship between the nature of war (as an
ecological system of sorts, in which its biological components seek to redistribute or control the application
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of power—to control the other’s choices in a way
believed to be self-beneficial) in its broadest and most
generic sense, and the consequential role of planning
that leads us to some conclusions about the relative
roles that various actors play on the stage of war.
FINAL THOUGHTS
War, in all of its varied forms and guises, seems to
be describable as an investment in organized violence
by parties interested in the extension, maintenance, or
appearance of their power over an unspecified time,
with an unknowable risk, for an uncertain reward.
The use of the word “investment” is deliberate. It connotes a thoughtful choice to begin a venture, not a
mere reactive spasm of violence that is undirected or
uncontrolled. It also connotes a venture with a naturally indeterminate conclusion, from which, of course,
all wars suffer. The fluctuating, dilating Legitimizing
Frame, the ever-changing authentic conditions frame,
the absolute extent of the parties’ means, motive, and
opportunity encoded in the Bounded Horizon and the
often opaque Local Horizon that separates the belligerent parties all fuel the entropy that universally
characterizes armed conflict and which prevents predictability or even long-term precise and educated
guessing.
Nevertheless, it is this appreciation of the fuguelike nature of war, manifesting in various guises but
always built upon these frames of reference that are all
characterized by choice—the animating and underlying theme of war—and which form the building blocks
of Clausewitz’s trinity, that should be used as the
starting point. All thought and practice devoted to the
ends, ways, and means of warfare—theories and practical realities alike—are derived from this fundamental
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nature. With new terms like Local and Bounded Horizons, the author humbly hopes that appreciating these
underlying truths becomes somewhat less opaque,
thorny, or undesirable, and to reinvigorate the profession of arms’ confidence in debating these issues with
the political principals who must ultimately assume
accountability for the consequences.
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